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hina is one of the few countries in the developing world that has made progress in
reducing its total number of poor during the past two decades (World Bank 2000).
Numbers of poor in China fell precipitously, from 260 million in 1978 to 50 million
in 1997.1 A reduction in poverty on this scale and within such a short time is unprecedented
in history and is considered by many to be one of the greatest achievements in human devel-
opment in the twentieth century.2 Contributing to this success are policy and institutional
reforms,  promotion  of  equal  access  to  social  services  and  production  assets,  and  public
investments in rural areas.
The literature on Chinese agricultural growth, regional inequality, and rural poverty re-
duction is extensive. But few have attempted to link these topics to public investment.3 We
argue that even with the economic reforms that began in the late 1970s it would have been im-
possible to achieve rapid economic growth and poverty reduction without the past several
decades of government investment. Prior to the reforms, the effects of government investment
were inhibited by policy and institutional barriers. The reforms reduced these barriers, en-
abling investments to generate tremendous economic growth and poverty reduction. Similarly,
public investment may have played a large role in reducing regional inequality, an issue of in-
creasing concern to policymakers.
China’s experience provides important lessons for other developing countries. In the gen-
eral literature on public economics, the rationale behind government spending is to spur effi-
ciency (or growth) by correcting market failures. Examples of such failures are externalities;
scale economies; failures in related markets like credit, insurance, and labor; nonexcludabil-
ity; and incomplete information about benefits and costs. Less attention is paid to the role of
1Unlike in many other developing countries, poverty in China has mainly been limited to rural areas. Urban
poverty incidence is extremely low, although there has been a slight increase recently (Piazza and Liang 1998).
The number of rural poor for each year is reported in the China Agricultural Development Report, a white paper
of the Ministry of Agriculture. The poverty line is defined as the level below which income (and food produc-
tion in rural areas) are below subsistence levels for food intake, shelter, and clothing.
2Even if the international standard of one dollar per day measured in purchasing power parity is used, China’s
poverty reduction is still remarkable when compared with other countries, having declined from 31.3 percent in
1990 to 11.5 percent in 1998. Using the same poverty line, the incidence of poverty in South Asia declined only
from 45 percent in 1987 to 40 percent in 1998, while for Africa as a whole incidence changed very little, from
46.6 percent in 1987 to 46.3 percent in 1998 (World Bank 2000).
3Some studies link public investment to food security and agricultural growth (Fan and Pardey 1992; Huang,
Rosegrant, and Rozelle 1997; Huang, Rozelle and Rosegrant 1999; Fan 2000). But very few link these invest-
ments to poverty reduction in a systematic way. Chapter 4 presents a more detailed literature review.
1public  investment  in  pursuing  equity  or
poverty alleviation objectives. Many neo-
classical economists favor solving poverty
problems  by  using  welfare  redistribution
means, for example, by taxing the rich and
transferring income directly to the poor. But
few  countries,  particularly  developing
countries,  have  succeeded  in  solving  the
poverty problem solely through direct in-
come  transfers.  Therefore,  more  govern-
ments are now convinced that poverty and
inequality may be more effectively reduced
by promoting the income-generation capac-
ity of the poor. Effective public spending
policy  is  one  of  the  instruments  used  to
achieve this.
Because many developing countries are
undergoing substantial macroeconomic ad-
justments and facing tight budgets, it is crit-
ical to analyze the relative contributions of
various expenditures to growth and poverty
reduction. Valuable  insights  can  thus  be
gained to further improve the allocative ef-
ficiency of limited, even declining, public
resources.
The primary purpose of this study is (1)
to develop an analytical framework for ex-
amining the specific role of different types
of government expenditure on growth, re-
gional inequality, and poverty reduction by
controlling for other factors such as institu-
tional and policy changes and (2) to apply
that framework to rural China.
Using provincial-level data for the past
several decades, we construct an economet-
ric model that permits calculation of eco-
nomic returns, the number of poor people
raised above the poverty line, and impact on
regional inequality for additional units of
expenditure on different items. The model
enables us to identify the different channels
through which government investments af-
fect growth, inequality, and poverty. For in-
stance, increased government investment in
roads  and  education  may  reduce  rural
poverty not only by stimulating agricultural
production, but also by creating improved
employment opportunities in the nonfarm
sector. Understanding these different effects
provides useful policy insights to improve
the effectiveness of government poverty al-
leviation strategies.
Moreover, the model enables us to cal-
culate  growth,  inequality,  and  poverty-re-
duction  effects  from  the  regional  dimen-
sion.  Specific  regional  information  helps
government to better target its limited re-
sources  and  achieve  more  equitable  re-
gional  development,  a  key  objective  de-
bated in both academic and policymaking
venues in China.
The rest of the report is organized as fol-
lows.  Chapter  2  details  the  evolution  of
growth,  inequality,  and  poverty  in  rural
China over the past several decades. Chap-
ter 3 describes trends of public investment
in technology, education, and infrastructure,
as these have long-term effects on growth,
poverty reduction, and income distribution.
Chapter 4 develops the conceptual frame-
work  to  track  multiple  poverty  effects  of
public investment. Chapter 5 describes the
data  and  estimation  strategy  and  presents
the estimation results. Chapter 6 concludes
the report with policy implications and fu-
ture suggested research directions.
2 CHAPTER 1CHAPTER 2
Growth, Inequality, and Poverty
T
his chapter examines trends in growth, inequality, and poverty, as well as associated
changes in institutions and policies. It thus provides a background for analysis in later
chapters of how various public investments affect growth, inequality, and poverty.
Macroeconomic Reforms
The dynamic growth of the Chinese economy over the past 50 years ranks among the most
important developments of the twentieth century. China has experienced a number of policy
and institutional reforms, some of which have involved abrupt dislocations of the country’s
economic, social, cultural, and political order. The official raison d’être for these reforms was
to promote rapid economic development and a more equal distribution of wealth, to attain
national self-sufficiency, and to further socialist or communist ideals. Two distinct stages are
normally used in describing the development of the national economy: adoption and imple-
mentation of a Soviet-type economy from 1952 to 1977 and gradual economic reform toward
a market-led economic system since 1978.
Prior to 1978, China faced a hostile international environment with political isolation and
economic embargoes. Political leaders adopted a heavy industry-oriented development strat-
egy to catch up with developed western countries. This approach is clearly stated in China’s
first five-year plan (1952–57) (Lin, Cai, and Li 1996).
To guarantee low production costs for the heavy industry sector, agricultural product prices
were suppressed to subsidize the cost of living of urban workers. The government also estab-
lished the hukou system of household registration in this period, confining people to the vil-
lage or city of their birth in order to ensure enough agricultural laborers to produce grain for
urban workers. This urban-biased policy created a large gap in income and standard of living
between rural and urban residents 1982–2000 (SSB, various years).
The state or collectives owned production assets, and all firms produced products in
accordance with government plans and quotas. Prices of both inputs and outputs were strictly
controlled by government without regard for market demand and supply. Allocation of inputs
among firms and products among consumers was also based on government plan rather than
on market signals. Workers earned a fixed monthly salary or an amount based on their work-
ing hours, often without consideration of their work efforts. All these policies led to an egali-
tarianism within rural areas and within cities, despite the large gap between them.
In spite of the counterproductive economic policies, the Chinese economy did exhibit
some important accomplishments during 1952–77. Foremost of these was a record of impres-
sive economic growth. From 1952 to 1977, China’s GDP grew at an average annual rate of
5.93 percent (Table 2.1). However, due to the obligatory savings inherent in the Soviet-type
3growth  strategy,  personal  consumption
grew at only 2.2 percent per annum during
the same period. The result was extremely
low living standards for the general popula-
tion, rural residents in particular.
Chinese economic reforms began in the
rural  areas  in  1978  (more  details  are  in-
cluded  in  the  next  section).  Urban-sector
reforms did not begin formally until 1984,
before which some reforms were enacted
piecemeal. But even after 1984, the reform
package was far from the “big bang” pro-
grams  then  being  advocated  for  Eastern
Europe  and  the  former  Soviet  Union.  In
particular,  China’s  urban-sector  reforms
emphasized  expansion  of  enterprise  and
local  autonomy  and  incentives  and  the
reduction—but not elimination—of within-
plan allocations (Groves et al. 1994).
In addition, China gradually opened its
economy to foreign trade and investment,
which not only contributed directly to rapid
economic growth but also helped to restruc-
ture the national economy. In the urban in-
dustrial sector, markets for most industrial
products replaced the planned allocation of
goods. In other words, state-owned enter-
prises were forced to operate according to
market rules. Furthermore, non-state enter-
prises, both domestic and foreign, could be
created  and  could  compete  with  state-
owned enterprises in these markets.
In terms of government fiscal and finan-
cial policies, which are directly relevant to
our study, the government decentralized its
management system by granting localities
greater flexibility in collecting revenue and
making expenditure decisions. This greatly
increased incentives for local governments
to develop their economies so as to retain
more  revenue  for  improving  local  infra-
structure  and  human  capital.  Due  to  the
regions’  differing  tax  bases,  the  trend  of
decentralization  might  have  affected  the
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Table 2.1 GDP and input growth by sector, 1952–97 (%)
Urban Urban Rural
Period Total Agriculture industry service enterprise
GDP
1952–77 5.93 3.66 9.43 5.10 n.a.
1978–89 9.50 8.38 6.47 13.91 19.27
1990–97 11.18 5.27 10.27 7.04 27.86
1978–97 9.81 7.25 7.32 11.00 21.56
1952–97 7.68 5.32 8.66 7.06 n.a.
Labor
1952–77 2.60 2.13 5.55 3.59 n.a.
1978–89 2.96 1.12 3.67 3.66 15.49
1990–97 1.23 –1.46 1.18 8.25 4.26
1978–97 2.94 0.90 2.86 6.65 11.01
1952–97 2.73 1.56 4.50 4.02 n.a.
Capital stock
1978–89 8.54 2.28 9.97 8.90 11.75
1990–95 9.25 6.00 6.69 10.60 18.11
1978–95 8.70 3.40 8.92 9.38 13.20
Source: Fan, Zhang, and Robinson 2001. They constructed GDPs for the four economic sectors based on
various China State Statistical Bureau (SSB) publications.
Note: N.a. means not available.level of public expenditures across regions,
therefore  perhaps  leading  to  differential
rates of growth and poverty reduction.4
As a result of the reform policies, na-
tional GDP grew at about 10 percent per
annum from 1978 to 1997 (Table 2.1). Per
capita income increased more than fourfold,
or 7.8 percent per annum. The overall living
standard of the Chinese population and na-
tional development indicators improved at
an  unprecedented  rate,  approaching  those
in  many  middle-income  countries  (World
Bank, World Development Report 2000).
Policy Reforms and
Agricultural Growth
This  section  reviews  major  institutional
changes and policy reforms in rural areas
and links these to production and produc-
tivity  growth  in  the  Chinese  agricultural
sector (Figure 2.1).5 Rural policy and insti-
tutional changes were linked to the macro-
economic policies described in the previous
section, but they exhibited different phases
and  they  had  much  greater  impact  on
growth and poverty reduction in rural areas.
Land Reform (Prior to 1953)
Large-scale land reform was one of the first
priorities of the newly formed Communist
government.  Until  the  1949  Revolution,
land ownership was feudal, with approxi-
mately 70 to 80 percent of the agricultural
land held by landlords who themselves con-
stituted only 10 percent of the rural popula-
tion. Most farmers were landless peasants
who rented land, often at exorbitant rates,
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Figure 2.1 Growth in agricultural production and productivity, 1952–97
Source: Fan and Zhang 2001.
4Lin and Liu (2000) analyzed the relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic growth in China.
They concluded that fiscal decentralization contributed significantly to economic growth, in addition to other key
factors such as rural reform, capital accumulation, and nonstate sector development.
5For milestones in reforming Chinese agriculture, see Appendix A.from  these  landowners.  Soon  after  1949,
land  was  confiscated  by  the  government
without compensation and redistributed to
peasant  farmers.  By  the  end  of  1952  the
land reform was successfully accomplished
(Ministry of Agriculture 1989).
Collectivization (1953–56)
Beginning in 1952, some small-scale peas-
ant farmers voluntarily pooled their land and
other resources into a cooperative mode of
operation. At first, farmers were free to join
or  leave  the  cooperatives  without  penalty.
Government  efforts  to  develop  large  col-
lective  operations  soon  followed,  and  by
1956 most of China’s agricultural produc-
tion  was  done  on  a  collective  basis  (Lin
1990; Putterman 1990). Under this system,
land ownership was vested in a collective
that usually consisted of some 200 families.
Within  the  collective,  an  individual’s  in-
come was tied to the number of work points
accumulated throughout the year in relation
to the time, effort, skill, and political attitude
the laborer brought to the collective work.
Households also farmed home gardens on
“private plots,” which then constituted about
5 percent of all arable land. Produce from
these gardens could be sold on free markets
(Ministry  of  Agriculture  1989).  All  these
policies led to rapid growth in both produc-
tion  and  productivity,  with  annual  growth
rates of 5.3 percent and 2.7 percent, respec-
tively (Fan and Zhang 2001).6
Great Leap Forward and
Communization (1957–60)
Beginning in 1958, the central government
promoted an even larger scale of production
in agriculture. Advanced cooperatives were
merged into communes. The forced rapid
collectivization gave farmers no incentives
to  increase  production  and  productivity,
since their income and well-being was no
longer linked to their work efforts. At the
height  of  the  commune  movement  in
1958–59, the average communal unit had
grown to 5,000 households covering 10,000
acres, and food was allocated as much on
the basis of need as on accumulated work
points. The communes owned virtually all
production  means  except  for  agricultural
labor. The government, through its adminis-
tration  and  procurement  systems,  rigidly
controlled both quantity and price of out-
puts  and  inputs.  Commune  leaders  made
production decisions, with the role of farm-
ers limited to supply of labor for commune
production. Work on private plots was also
prohibited.  As  a  result,  both  agricultural
production  and  productivity  declined
sharply,  by  6  percent  and  5  percent  per
annum, respectively (Figure 2.1). The wide-
spread drought and flood in most of China
in 1959 worsened the devastating situation.
An estimated 30 million people died of star-
vation, one of the largest human tragedies
in history (Lin 1990; Lin and Yang 2000).
Economic Adjustments
(1961–65)
The Great Famine (1959–61) led the gov-
ernment  to  implement  an  adjustment  and
consolidation policy after 1961. Production
was decentralized into smaller units called
“production teams,” a sub-unit of the com-
mune consisting of only 20 to 30 neighbor-
ing  families.  By  1962,  production  teams
were  the  basic  unit  of  operations  and
accounting in most rural areas. Decisions
6 CHAPTER 2
6The growth rates of agricultural production and productivity used here are new measures constructed by Fan
and Zhang (2001). They adjusted livestock and fishery output data to measure growth in output, input, and total
factor productivity for Chinese agriculture based on detailed quantity and price information. Fan and Zhang
found that official statistics overestimate both aggregate output and input, resulting in biased estimates of total
factor productivity growth. Furthermore, the official data overstates the impact of the rural reforms on both pro-
duction and productivity growth. Nevertheless, both production and productivity still grew at respectable rates
during the reform period.on farm operations, including the adoption
of new technologies, were primarily made
by team leaders (MOA 1989). Production
and productivity recovered rapidly, grow-
ing at more than 9.0 percent and 4.7 percent
per annum, respectively (Figure 2.1).
Cultural Revolution
(1966–76)
During the Cultural Revolution of 1966–76,
production  and  productivity  growth  were
again  depressed  by  policy  failures.  The
government  reinstated  many  controls  that
were loosened during the three-year adjust-
ment period of 1962–65. Although produc-
tion was still organized in the smaller unit
production teams, it was nonetheless tightly
controlled  by  government.  Farmers’  in-
comes were not closely related to their pro-
duction efforts. The government controlled
virtually all input and output markets. No
market  transactions  of  major  agricultural
products were allowed outside the procure-
ment system. Market exchanges of land be-
tween different production units in the col-
lective system were also outlawed. Because
farmers  had  few  incentives,  inefficiency
was  rampant  in  agricultural  production.
Production during this period grew at 2.6
percent per annum, and there was virtually
no gain in total factor productivity.
The First Phase of Reform
(1979–84)
Due to the more than two decades of poor
performance of the agricultural sector, cen-
tral government decided to reform the rural
areas in 1978. These reforms occurred in
two  reasonably  distinct  phases.  The  first
phase focused on decentralizing the system
of agricultural production, while the second
phase  emphasized  liberalizing  factor  and
output markets.7
During the initial phase of the reforms,
the state raised its procurement prices for
agricultural  products  and  reopened  rural
markets for farmers to trade produce from
their private plots. After two years of ex-
periments, in 1981 the government began to
decentralize  agricultural  production  from
the  commune  system  to  individual  farm
households. By 1984, more than 99 percent
of production units had adopted the house-
hold  production  responsibility  system.
Under  the  system,  farmers  were  free  to
make production decisions based on market
prices as long as they fulfilled government
procurement  quotas  for  grains.  Land  was
still owned by the collectives, but use rights
could be transferred.
In addition to decentralization of the pro-
duction system, government began to reform
the  agricultural  procurement  system.  Prior
to  1984,  virtually  all  commodities  were
subject to various government procurement
programs.  In  1984,  the  number  of  com-
modities  within  the  government  procure-
ment system was gradually reduced, from
113 to 38 (Ministry of Agriculture 1989).
Unsurprisingly, both technical efficiency
(from the decentralization of the production
system)  and  allocative  efficiency  (from
price and marketing reforms) increased sig-
nificantly during this first phase of reforms.
Production increased by more than 6.6 per-
cent  and  productivity  by  6.1  percent  per
annum from 1979 to 1984 (Figure 2.1).
The Second Phase Reform
(1985–89)
The second phase of reforms was designed
to further liberalize the country’s (agricul-
tural) pricing and marketing systems. How-
ever,  the  government  cut  the  marginal
(above-quota) procurement price for grain
in 1985. Meanwhile, input prices increased
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7Various studies attempt to assess the impact of this reform on production growth (McMillan, Whalley, and Zhu
1989; Fan 1990, 1991; Lin 1992; Zhang and Carter 1997; Fan and Pardey 1997; Huang, Rosegrant, and Rozelle
1997). All found that during this initial stage of reform, institutional and market reform was the major source of
productivity growth.much faster than the government’s output
procurement  prices,  raising  production
costs.8 The result was an end to the rapid
output growth of the previous five years.
Annual production grew at only 2.7 percent
during  this  second  phase  of  reforms,  and
there were no significant productivity gains
(Figure 2.1).
New Developments in Agricultural
Policy (1990–Present)
The  1990s  marked  a  new  development
stage in Chinese agriculture.9 The govern-
ment continued to implement market and
price reforms, and it further reduced the
number of commodities under the govern-
ment procurement system. The number of
commodities subject to state procurement
programs declined from 38 in 1985 to only
9 in 1991. In 1993, the grain market was
further  liberalized,  and  the  grain  ration-
ing system that had been in existence for
40  years  was  abolished.  In  1993,  more
than 90 percent of all agricultural produce
was  sold  at  market-determined  prices,  a
clear  indication  of  the  degree  to  which
China’s agriculture had been transformed
from a command-and-control system to a
largely free-market one. To increase farm-
ers’  incomes,  government  increased  its
procurement prices for grains by 40 per-
cent  in  1994.  In  1996,  it  increased  pro-
curement prices 42 percent further. As a
result, agricultural production and produc-
tivity continued to rise rapidly with growth
rates  of  3.8  percent  and  2.3  percent  per
annum,  respectively,  from  1990  to  1997
(although these were lower than during the
first phase of the reforms).
Rural Nonfarm Sector
One of the most dramatic changes in rural
China has been the rapid increase of rural
enterprises during the past two decades.10
Employment in the nonfarm sector as a per-
centage  of  total  rural  employment  grew
from  7  percent  in  1978  to  29  percent  in
1997 (Table 2.2). By 1997, rural enterprise
accounted for more than a quarter of na-
tional GDP. Yet this sector was almost non-
existent even as late as 1978. In 1997, GDP
produced  by  rural  industry  in  China  was
larger than the GDP of the entire industrial
sector of India.11 Without development of
the  rural  nonfarm  sector,  annual  GDP
growth in China from 1978 to 1995 would
have been 2.4 percent lower per annum.
The rapid development of the rural non-
farm  sector  not  only  contributed  to  rapid
national  GDP  growth,  but  also  raised  the
average per capita income of rural residents.
In 1997, more than 36 percent of rural in-
come  was  from  rural  nonfarm  activities
(SSB 1998), while rural income in 1978 was
predominantly from agricultural production.
The rural nonfarm sector developed in
several stages. The first can be traced back
as  far  as  1958,  when  communes  set  up
many small-scale industrial enterprises (for
example, steel mills), all of which failed im-
mediately.12 During the nationwide agricul-
tural  mechanization  drive  of  the  early
1970s,  rural  small-scale  industrial  enter-
prises reemerged. Most of these started as
agricultural machine repair shops and food-
processing  mills.  Many  enterprises  in  the
urban hinterlands soon became subcontrac-
tors of state-owned enterprises. These com-
munity  enterprises  were  known  as  “com-
8 CHAPTER 2
8The rising cost of production was reported by the Ministry of Agriculture in its Production Cost Survey
(various years).
9Huang, Lin, and Rozelle (1999) provide a good summary of Chinese agricultural policies since the 1980s.
10Qian and Jin (1998), Chen and Rozelle (1999), Lin and Yao (1999), and Oi (1999) discuss the development of
rural enterprise and its contribution to the Chinese economy from different angles.
11Calculated by the authors using data from the World Bank’s World Development Report 2000.
12This is largely due to the national industrialization drive during the Great Leap Forward.mune  and  brigade  enterprises.”  During
most of the pre-reform period, the develop-
ment of rural industry was embryonic and
often restricted by the central and local gov-
ernments, because it was in direct conflict
with the government’s top priority of pro-
ducing the maximum amount of grain for
both urban and rural needs.
After the 1979 rural reforms, the non-
farm sector became the most dynamic in the
Chinese national economy. Rapid growth in
agricultural labor productivity and rural in-
come increased rural demand and generated
tremendous labor surplus and initial invest-
ment,  providing  great  opportunities  for
farmers to develop the nonagricultural sec-
tor. In addition, the local governments, par-
ticularly those in the relatively developed
regions,  shifted  their  focus  to  promote
“township and village enterprises” (Rozelle
and Boisvert 1994). In 1984, with the abol-
ishment of the commune system, the central
government  renamed  commune  and
brigade enterprises as township and village
enterprises.  Central  government’s  attitude
towards  these  enterprises  also  changed
from tolerance to encouragement. Fearing
that rural enterprises might become similar
to  the  inefficient  state-owned  enterprises,
since 1994 many local governments have
tried  to  reform  these  rural  enterprises  by
providing more autonomy to managers and
modifying property rights.13 For example,
stock-sharing and privatization were intro-
duced in recent years. These new reforms
helped to maintain the rate of growth in the
sector in the 1990s.
The success of the rural nonfarm econ-
omy  had  far-reaching  impact  on  China’s
economy. In addition to providing employ-
ment and income for rural population (dis-
cussed  earlier),  the  rapid  development  of
rural industry and services not only demon-
strated potential gains from reform, but it
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Table 2.2 Development of the rural nonfarm sector, 1978–97
Employment Rural Rural nonfarm Rural
as a percentage nonfarm GDP as a nonfarm
Employment of total rural GDP percentage of annual wage
Year (thousands) employment (index) national GDP (1990 yuan)
1978 2,243 7.00 100 4.00 640
1980 1,956 6.00 133 4.30 763
1985 6,715 18.00 370 6.70 1,141
1990 8,673 21.00 938 10.40 1,322
1995 12,708 28.00 4,662 25.50 2,001
1997 13,527 29.00 6,007 28.20 2,286
Annual growth rate (%)
1978–85 16.96 20.56 7.56 8.61
1985–90 5.25 20.44 9.27 2.99
1990–97 6.56 30.38 15.30 8.14
1978–97 9.92 24.05 10.81 6.93
Sources: Calculated by authors from various issues of the China Statistical Yearbook (SSB) and the China Rural
Statistical Yearbook (SSB).
13Many township and village enterprises, particularly large-scale industrial enterprises in coastal areas, had char-
acteristics similar to state-owned enterprises (for example, heavy controls from township and village govern-
ments, unregulated taxes, subsidies, and donations for development of local roads, schools, and hospitals).also created competitive pressure for urban
sectors to reform as well. Without the suc-
cessful  reforms  in  agriculture,  which  in-
creased  agricultural  productivity  and  re-
leased  resources  for  work  elsewhere,  and
rapid development of the rural nonfarm sec-
tor, the post-1984 urban reforms and rapid
growth would have been impossible.
Structural Change and the
Role of the Rural Sector
The Chinese economy experienced massive
structural transformation over the past sev-
eral decades as a result of differing sectoral
growth rates (Figure 2.2).14 In 1952, agri-
culture  accounted  for  more  than  half  of
GDP,  while  urban  industry  and  services
accounted for 21 percent and 29 percent,
respectively.  The  Chinese  economy  was
largely agrarian. But by 1997 agriculture’s
share had declined to about 20 percent of
GDP—about  two-thirds  of  a  percentage
point per year, which is a rapid rate of struc-
tural change. At the same time, the share of
rural enterprise increased from almost zero
to 30 percent. Therefore the rural sector as
a whole (agriculture and rural nonfarm) still
accounts for more than half of total GDP
in China today.
Labor  shifts  among  sectors  were  also
phenomenal. In 1952, more than 80 percent
of the national labor force was in the agri-
cultural sector, while only 6 percent worked
in  urban  industry  and  10  percent  in  the
urban service sector. By 1997, less than half
of  the  labor  force  was  engaged  in  agri-
cultural  activities.  More  than  13  percent
worked in the urban industrial sector and
10 percent in the urban service sector. Rural
enterprises employed over one-fifth of the
total labor in 1997 (Figure 2.2).
In  1978,  agriculture  accounted  for
20 percent of the total capital stock, while
urban industry and services accounted for
38 and 33 percent, respectively, and rural
enterprises accounted for only 6 percent. By
1997,  given  slow  growth  in  agricultural
capital investment, the share of agriculture
in  the  total  capital  stock  declined  dra-
matically  to  8.8  percent.  Both  urban  in-
dustry and services increased their shares
to 44.5 and 38.7 percent, respectively. Al-
though the total absolute amount of rural
enterprise capital stock grew rapidly (13 per-
cent per year), the growth was slower than




Trends in Growth, Poverty,
and Income Distribution
Per capita income in rural China was ex-
tremely low prior to the reforms. In 1978,
average income per rural resident was only
about 220 yuan per year, or about US$150
(Table 2.3).16 During the 29 years from 1949
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14For the effect of structural change on the Chinese economy, see Nyberg and Rozelle (1999) and Fan, Zhang,
and Robinson (2001). Fan, Zhang, and Robinson found that more than 17 percent of economic growth during
1978–95 could be attributed to structural change among four economic sectors (agriculture, rural enterprise,
urban industry, and urban service).
15Future structural change is needed since there still exist large differences in labor and capital productivi-
ties among sectors, according to Fan, Zhang, and Robinson (2001). Their findings indicate that the returns
to capital investment in both agricultural production and rural enterprise are much higher than those in urban
sectors, indicating underinvestment in rural areas. On the other hand, labor productivity in the agricultural
sector remains low, a result of the still large surpluses of labor in the sector. Therefore, the further develop-
ment of rural enterprise and increased labor flow among sectors and across regions are key to improving
overall economic efficiency.
16Total and per capita incomes in this report are all measured in 1990 constant prices.to  1978,  per  capita  income  increased  by
only 95 percent, or 2.3 percent per annum.
China was one of the poorest countries in
the world. Most rural people struggled to
survive from day to day. In 1978, 260 mil-
lion residents in rural China, or 33 percent
of the total rural population, lived below the
poverty  line,  without  access  to  sufficient
food or income to maintain a healthy and
productive life.
This  changed  dramatically  directly
after the initiation of rural reforms in 1978.
Per capita income increased to 522 yuan
in 1984 from 220 yuan in 1978, a growth
rate of 15 percent per annum (Table 2.3).
The  income  gains  were  shared  widely
enough to cut the number of poor, hence
the rate of poverty, by more than half  By
1984, only 11 percent of the rural popu-
lation  was  below  the  poverty  line.  Be-
cause  of  the  equitable  distribution  of
land  to  families,  income  inequality,
measured  as  Gini  coefficient,  increased
only slightly (Figure 2.3).
During  the  second  stage  of  reforms
(1985–89), rural income continued to in-
crease,  but  at  the  much  slower  pace  of
3 percent per annum (Table 2.3). This was
due mainly to the stagnation of agricul-
tural production after the reforms, as dis-
cussed in the previous section. The effects
of fast agricultural growth on rural pov-
erty  were  largely  exhausted  by  the  end
of 1984. Over this same period, rural in-
come distribution became less egalitarian,
and  the  Gini  index  rose  from  0.264  to
0.301 (SSB 1990). The ratio of per capita
rural  income  in  coastal  regions  to  that
in other areas also increased, from 1.21
to  1.51  (Zhang  and  Kanbur  2001).  The
changes in income distribution probably
resulted from the changed nature of in-
come gains and the growing differential
in rural nonfarm opportunities among re-
gions (Rozelle 1994).
With  real  crop  prices  stagnating  and
input prices rising, rural income gains had
to come from increased efficiency in agri-
cultural production and marketing or from
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Figure 2.2 Structural shift of GDP, labor, and capital, 1978–97
Source: Fan, Zhang, and Robinson 2001.
Note: Total capital stock data only go up to 1995.employment  outside  of  agriculture.17 Al-
though  the  poor  had  increased  access  to
modern inputs, their generally adverse pro-
duction  conditions  kept  gains  low.  With
nonfarm income an increasingly large pro-
portion of rural income, regional variations
in nonfarm income played a growing role in
worsening income distributions, according
to  Rozelle.  Development  of  the  nonfarm
sector  was  concentrated  mostly  in  the
coastal areas, where per capita income was
already high and poverty incidence much
lower than elsewhere. The large areas in the
west and border provinces, home to most of
the rural poor, lagged far behind. As a re-
sult, the number of poor increased from 89
million in 1984 to 103 million in 1989, a net
gain of 14 million in five years (Table 2.3).
Only in 1990 did rural poverty begin to
decline  once  again.  The  number  of  rural
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Table 2.3 Per capita income and incidence of poverty in rural China, 1978–97
Per capita income Incidence of poverty
Yuan per Percentage Absolute
person of urban number Percentage Gini
Year (1990 prices) residents (millions) of population coefficient
1978 220 42 260 32.90 0.21
1979 263 43 239 30.00 0.22
1980 306 44 218 27.10 0.23
1981 349 49 194 24.30 0.24
1982 414 55 140 17.50 0.23
1983 467 59 123 15.20 0.25
1984 522 58 89 11.10 0.26
1985 593 58 96 11.90 0.26
1986 612 51 97 12.00 0.29
1987 644 51 91 11.10 0.29
1988 685 49 86 10.40 0.30
1989 674 44 103 12.40 0.30
1990 686 49 97 11.50 0.31
1991 700 42 95 11.10 0.31
1992 741 39 90 10.60 0.31
1993 765 39 80 9.40 0.32
1994 803 38 70 8.20 0.33
1995 846 41 65 7.60 0.34
1996 922 44 58 6.70 n.a.
1997 964 40 50 5.80 n.a.
Annual growth rate (%)
1978–84 15.49 5.53 –16.36 –16.59
1985–89 3.26 –6.67 1.78 1.03
1990–97 4.98 –2.86 –9.03 –9.35
1978–97 9.68 –0.30 –9.79 –10.28
Source: The China Statistical Yearbook (SSB) and China Agricultural Development Report (MOA, various years).
Note: N.a. means not available.
17During this period, the real agricultural price increased by only 0.17 percent per annum, while the growth was
8.8 percent per annum during the first phase of the reform from 1978 to 1984 (SSB, 1984–95).poor dropped 9 percent per annum, from
103 million in 1989 to 50 million in 1997.
Moreover, the rate of rural poverty reduc-
tion was faster than that of income growth
(5 percent per annum) during the period, in-
dicating  that  factors  other  than  income
growth were at play. In 1995, the govern-
ment set itself a target of eliminating all
rural poverty by 2000. To accomplish that
goal, it introduced a series of policies and
committed substantial financial resources.
Rural  residents  earned  less  than  half
their urban cohorts in 1978, with rural in-
come  42  percent  of  that  in  urban  areas
(Table 2.3). Due to the success of rural re-
forms, that percentage increased to 59 per-
cent  in  1983.  But  it  declined  again  to
40 percent in 1997, mainly owing to fast
growth in urban areas and relatively slug-
gish increases in rural earnings.
Poverty  in  China  is  therefore  still
mainly  a  rural  phenomenon.  Urban  poor
have  been  relatively  few  in  number  in
China, although income distribution in the
cities has deteriorated in recent years (Park,
Wang, and Wu 2001; World Bank 1992). In
1990, average per capita income among the
poorest  5  percent  of  urban  residents  was
689 yuan, more than double the urban ab-
solute poverty line of 321 yuan and greater
than the per capita income of 65 percent of
rural residents. Less than 1 percent of the
urban population—about one million peo-
ple—had incomes below the estimated ab-
solute poverty line each year from 1983 to
1990. Higher income levels, complemented
by  annual  consumer  food  subsidies  of  at
least 200 yuan per urban recipient, left the
registered  urban  population  much  better
nourished than their rural counterparts. In
more recent years, however, many former
state employees were laid off due to the re-
form of state-owned enterprises. Incidence
of  urban  poverty  may  therefore  have  in-
creased. Nevertheless, the size and severity
of urban poverty remains of a much lesser
scale than in the rural areas.
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Figure 2.3 Income, inequality, and change in poverty in rural
China, 1978–97
Source: Table 2.3.
Note: Gini coefficient estimates only go up to 1995.Geographic Distribution
of Rural Poor
Rural poverty is concentrated in mountain-
ous areas, primarily in the several ranges
and high plateaus that define the western
boundary of traditional Han agriculture and
on the Northern China Plain (World Bank
2000a; Park, Wang, and Wu 2001). More
than 60 percent of the rural poor in 1996
lived in border provinces such as Gansu,
Yunan, Sichuan, Guizhou, Guangxi, Qing-
hai, Ningxia, Inner Mongolia, and Xinjiang
(Figure 2.4). Given the low population den-
sity  in  these  areas,  the  poverty  incidence
was much higher than the national average
(Figure  2.5).  For  example,  23  percent  of
rural population in Gansu and 27 percent in
Xinjiang  lived  under  the  poverty  line  in
1996.  Another  pocket  of  poverty  is  the
Northern  China  Plain,  where  the  poor
account for 22 percent of the national total.
This area includes Henan, Hebei, Shannxi,
and  Shaanxi,  where  meager  natural  re-
sources,  particularly  poor  soil  and  scarce
water, are the major reasons for high con-
centration of rural poor.
One  salient  feature  of  China’s  rural
poverty is that individual and family char-
acteristics appear to be less important than
in  other  countries  in  explaining  poverty.
There are several reasons for this phenome-
non.  First,  within  villages,  the  egalitarian
access to economic assets that began in the
1950s and continued through the distribu-
tion of collective means of production in the
early 1980s limits the development of asset-
based income inequality. In particular, land-
use rights (not ownership) are equally dis-
tributed, and there are few if any landless
laborers (Li 1998). This contrasts sharply
with  other  developing  countries  such  as
India where a large percentage of the rural
poor  are  landless  laborers.  Moreover,  ac-
cess to social services such as education and
medical care in China tends to be village,
not family, specific. Second, because of the
compulsory system of primary and second-
ary education, most children receive basic
education and become literate. Third, con-
tinued state control of major agricultural in-
puts, such as fertilizer, and of major outputs
reduces  opportunities  to  exploit  different
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Figure 2.4 Number of rural poor by province, 1996 (thousands)





4,780.6–7,702.6abilities  in  those  markets.  Finally,  collec-
tives directly control or strongly influence
access  to  many  forms  of  nonagricultural




Prior to 1979, the major national objective
of rural policy was to provide cheap food,
capital, and labor for urban residents and in-
dustrial development. To achieve this, gov-
ernment tightly controlled rural production,
marketing,  and  trade.  Production  targets
and  state  mandatory  procurement  quotas
were  determined  according  to  urban  re-
quirements. Procurement prices for agricul-
tural  products  were  normally  set  below
international prices, transferring rents from
farmers to the industrial sector. Urban- and
industrial-biased  development  strategies
were implemented at farmers’ expense. Re-
ducing rural poverty was therefore not for-
mally  part  of  the  government’s  policy
agenda during most of the pre-reform period.
A poverty alleviation program was not
effectively formulated until 1986.18 As the
program’s  first  step,  central  government
designated  331  poor  counties  (roughly
16 percent of the total) based on per capita
rural  income.  These  counties  received
special funds from the central government
for the explicit purpose of poverty allevia-
tion.  One  billion  yuan  (in  current  prices)
was allocated in 1986 alone. An additional
800  million  yuan  was  added  annually  in
subsequent  years.  These  funds  were  sup-
posed  to  be  used  as  direct  loans  to  poor
farmers  or  to  rural  enterprises.  In  1991,
36 more counties were designated as poor
to  receive  500  million  yuan  in  loans  for
poverty reduction. In 1993, the designation
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Figure 2.5 Percentage of rural poor in total rural population, 1996
18For a chronology of major government events in poverty reduction, see Appendix B. Piazza and Liang (1998)
and Park, Wang, and Wu (2001) also give excellent descriptions of China’s anti-poverty programs and strategies.





12.8–27.4of  poor  counties  was  adjusted  based  on
changes in income and price indices. The
number  of  poor  counties  was  thereafter
fixed at 592 (Table 2.4). Most of these coun-
ties are in the border and mountainous areas
of Yunnan,  Sichuan,  Guizhou,  Shaanxi,
Shanxi, Hebei, Inner Mongolia, and Gansu.
With  respect  to  government  organiza-
tions,  the  State  Council  established  the
Leading Group for Economic Development
in Poor Areas. This group brought together
more than 20 ministries. In effect it encom-
passed all the government agencies whose
work  was  relevant  to  poverty  alleviation,
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Table 2.4 Regional distribution of rural poor
Official Chinese data
Khan (1997) Poor counties
Share of Rural poor as as  share of
households share of total  Number total provincial Head Head
that are poor, national poor, of poor counties, count, count,
1989 1989 counties, 1997 1988 1995 Change
Province (%) (%) 1997 (%) (%) (%) (%)
Beijing 0.2 0 0 0.0 8.7 1.3 –7.4
Tianjin 0.4 0 0 0.0 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Hebei 13 7.1 39 28.3 29.9 22.7 –7.2
Shanxi 17.4 4.1 35 34.7 51.9 49.5 –2.4
Inner Mongolia 23.5 3.6 31 36.5 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Liaoning 8 1.9 9 20.5 27 21.9 –5.1
Jilin 12.2 1.9 5 12.2 41.5 18.3 –23.2
Heilongjian 18.3 3.6 11 16.4 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Shanghai 0 0 0 0.0 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Jiangsu 3.4 1.9 0 0.0 27.8 4.7 –23.1
Zhejiang 2 0.8 3 4.7 5.8 4 –1.8
Anhui 7.7 3.9 17 25.4 35.6 19.8 –15.8
Fujian 1.8 0.5 8 13.1 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Jiangxi 5 1.6 18 20.9 25.7 27 1.3
Shandong 6.8 5 10 10.6 28.3 19.3 –9
Henan 16.5 12.7 28 24.6 52.5 20.1 –32.4
Hubei 6 2.6 25 36.8 20.3 25 4.7
Hunan 6.2 3.5 10 11.2 13.1 37.5 24.4
Guangdong 0.9 0.5 8 8.3 4.8 5.2 0.4
Guangxi 15.4 6.1 28 34.6 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Sichuan 11.2 11.2 43 24.9 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Guizhou 17.8 5.4 48 60.8 32.5 43.1 10.6
Yunnan 19 6.5 73 59.8 58.3 61.8 3.5
Tibet 5 6.5 47.3 45.6 –1.7
Shaanxi 20.3 5.8 50 56.2 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Gansu 34.2 6.7 41 53.9 59.9 58 –1.9
Qinghai 23.7 0.8 14 35.9 69.7 69 –0.7
Ningxia 18.9 0.7 8 44.4 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Xinjiang 18.7 1.6 25 29.4 n.a. n.a. n.a.
China 11.1 100 592 27.8 35.1 28.6 –6.5
Sources: World Bank 2000a and Khan 1997.
Notes: N.a. means not available. The regional groupings are explained in footnote 33.thus providing a mechanism both to influ-
ence the initiatives taken by the various min-
istries and to seek coordination in this area.
China’s  poverty  alleviation  strategy
developed in three steps. Prior to 1984, so-
cial welfare and relief funds were mainly
used to subsidize poor families. No formal
strategy existed for reducing the number of
poor  in  rural  areas.  From  1984  to  1995,
government pursued a strategy of “regional
targeting,” that is, alleviating poverty by de-
veloping regional or local economies. This
strategy  effectively  wiped  out  large-scale
poverty by developing poor areas, although
it  brought  little  benefit  to  the  extremely
poor in the poorest areas. The poor were
thus  increasingly  concentrated  in  remote
locales  with  limited  access  to  roads  and
other infrastructure, making it difficult for
the development of the regional economy to
trickle down to them. After 1996, the gov-
ernment altered its strategy to one of target-
ing poor households directly.
One program under this strategy is the
food-for-work program, designed to build
necessary infrastructure in poor rural areas.
The scheme provides a fund through which
roads,  irrigation,  and  other  construction
projects are carried out by extremely poor
farmers,  most  of  whom  are  identified  by
village heads. Those employed on the proj-
ects sometimes receive food or, more fre-
quently, vouchers that can be exchanged for
food and other basic necessities.19
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19Several  studies  assess  the  effects  of  these  programs  (Zhu  and  Jiang  1995;  Park,  Wang,  and  Wu  2001),
concluding that most are modestly effective in rural poverty reduction.CHAPTER 3
Public Capital and Investment
T
his chapter reviews the development of technology, education, and infrastructure and
government spending on these types of capital. Such investments are a major source of
long-term economic growth and poverty reduction. They have contributed not only to
growth in agricultural production, providing an adequate food supply for the ever larger and
richer population, but also to development of the rural nonfarm sector. The latter has become
increasingly important for further poverty reduction in rural areas.
Research
China’s agricultural research system expanded rapidly during the past four decades to become
one of the largest public systems in the world. It employed more than 50,000 senior scientists
and spent 4.1 billion current yuan (or 2.2 billion yuan in 1990 prices) on research conducted
in  national,  provincial,  and  prefecture  research  institutes  and  agricultural  universities  in
1997.20 By the early 1990s, the latest years for which comparative figures are available, the
Chinese system accounted for over 18 percent of the less developed world’s agricultural re-
search expenditures (Pardey, Roseboom, and Fan 1998).
Nonetheless, the Chinese agricultural research system experienced many ups and downs
over the last several decades. China’s investment in agricultural research was minimal right
after the founding of the People’s Republic in 1949, but it grew rapidly thereafter until 1960.
Growth in the 1960s was relatively slow due to the Great Famine (1959–61) and the Cultural
Revolution (1966–76). Although investment increased steadily during the 1970s (Table 3.1),
growth slowed in the 1980s to 23 percent during the entire 10 year period. In the 1990s, agri-
cultural research expenditures again began to rise, largely due to government efforts to boost
grain production through science and technology.
As a percentage of agricultural gross domestic product (AgGDP), agricultural research
investment was relatively low during the first five-year plan period, at 0.12 percent, but it
increased to 0.56 percent for the period 1958–76. The percentage then gradually declined to
0.3 percent in recent years. However, since AgGDP has grown rapidly, government invest-
ment in agricultural research has increased substantially in absolute terms over the last several
decades, but it declined relative to the size of the agricultural sector (Fan 2000). In compari-
son with other low-income countries in Asia, China moved from investing relatively more
20In 1997, research expenditures in the Chinese agricultural research system (including research expenses by
agricultural universities) were 4.1 billion in current Chinese yuan. This is equivalent to US$500 million meas-
ured by nominal exchange rate, and $2.03 billion measured by 1997 purchasing power parity.
18PUBLIC CAPITAL AND INVESTMENT 19
Table 3.1 Public spending in rural China, 1953–97 (millions of 1990 yuan)
Communi-
Year R&D Irrigation Education Roads Power cation
1953 17 177 2,584 194 3 18
1954 33 578 2,617 214 9 24
1955 55 530 2,490 224 13 26
1956 129 1,002 3,480 240 17 74
1957 128 970 3,583 359 18 50
1958 270 3,423 3,275 783 42 116
1959 452 3,139 4,815 522 58 172
1960 770 5,291 6,314 510 78 193
1961 386 1,879 3,876 432 31 34
1962 266 1,255 3,140 75 23 18
1963 379 2,147 3,551 224 39 22
1964 510 2,693 4,193 321 64 47
1965 584 2,520 4,405 424 136 110
1966 541 3,142 4,657 334 155 66
1967 337 2,899 4,114 382 191 75
1968 325 1,946 3,024 430 238 117
1969 530 2,905 3,038 488 290 138
1970 657 3,416 3,060 537 287 156
1971 613 4,002 3,917 488 345 171
1972 800 4,453 5,034 537 417 211
1973 763 5,691 5,590 585 419 251
1974 761 5,811 6,617 634 482 289
1975 883 5,859 6,944 572 623 278
1976 861 6,293 7,593 488 752 261
1977 897 6,089 7,882 525 734 249
1978 1,145 8,566 7,526 682 1,046 298
1979 1,319 9,856 9,198 733 1,044 260
1980 1,295 7,457 10,660 693 988 237
1981 1,212 5,188 11,289 381 1,073 240
1982 1,221 5,700 12,454 416 1,237 259
1983 1,516 6,160 13,815 449 1,551 303
1984 1,765 5,803 16,208 481 1,943 407
1985 1,764 5,183 19,025 1,253 2,565 457
1986 1,770 5,510 22,359 1,381 3,642 589
1987 1,644 6,154 26,432 1,626 4,522 847
1988 1,833 5,862 26,988 1,916 4,482 828
1989 1,754 5,744 22,917 2,082 4,151 900
1990 1,625 7,164 25,006 2,559 4,968 1,078
1991 1,790 9,820 28,530 2,973 5,607 1,414
1992 2,143 13,739 32,261 5,200 7,110 2,361
1993 2,230 14,344 38,059 3,795 8,633 5,003
1994 2,291 13,600 34,695 4,938 8,910 8,009
1995 2,267 15,417 34,139 5,673 9,597 7,795
1996 2,348 15,136 38,636 7,956 15,195 7,489
1997 2,170 23,415 41,024 10,700 14,147 9,350
Annual growth rate (%)
1953–78 19.14 17.55 4.55 5.37 26.85 12.44
1979–89 2.89 –5.26 9.56 11.01 14.81 13.21
1990–96 4.21 18.43 7.33 22.68 16.13 36.15
1953–96 11.63 11.74 6.48 9.54 20.79 15.28
Sources: Fan and Pardey 1997, Fan 2000, and SSB various years.
Notes: For more details about the data sources refer to Chapter 5. R&D spending includes both national and
sub-national government expenditures. Irrigation expenditures include government spending on reservoir
construction, irrigation projects, and flood and lodging prevention. Expenditures on urban water supply,
navigation, and hydropower generation are excluded. Spending on R&D, irrigation, and education
include all expenditures (current and capitals), while spending on roads, power, and communication
only include capital construction (usually 80–90 percent of total expenditure).20 CHAPTER 3
than  average  during  the  1970s  to  below
average at present (Pardey, Roseboom, and
Fan 1998).
Agricultural research expenditure as a
percentage  of  total  government  spending
was comparatively low in the 1950s, aver-
aging  0.10  percent  during  1953–57  and
0.38 percent for 1958–60. Thereafter, the
ratios  of  government  spending  remained
relatively stable, hovering around 0.50 to
0.55  percent  except  during  the  Cultural
Revolution  when  the  share  was  substan-
tially lower. Agricultural research spending
as a share of total national research and de-
velopment  (R&D)  expenditures  was  also
quite stable. China earmarked some 10 to
13 percent of total R&D expenditures for
agriculture during the past four decades. In
contrast, agricultural research expenditures
as  a  percentage  of  government  spending
on agriculture increased steadily, from just
1.5 percent during the first five-year plan
period to surpass 6 percent in the last decade.
The  development  of  China’s  research
personnel  has  not  matched  the  pattern  of
funds  allocated  to  research.  Specifically,
three phases can be identified. During the
1950s and 1960s the number of researchers
increased steadily. By 1973 about 10,000
scientists worked in the Chinese system.21
From 1973 to 1990, numbers of research
personnel  increased  rapidly,  to  almost
60,000  researchers,  a  rate  of  increase  in
excess  of  10  percent  per  annum.  During
the third stage (after 1990), the number of
researchers  stabilized  at  around  60,000.
After 1995, the number of researchers de-
clined marginally, to about 53,000 in 1997.
Increased numbers of researchers from
new  graduates  combined  with  a  lack  of
growth in expenditures caused expenditure
per scientist to drop sharply from 1979 to
1991.  Although  in  more  recent  years  ex-
penditure  per  scientist  has  increased  sub-
stantially in nominal terms, in real terms it
has grown only marginally.
The regional pattern of R&D expendi-
tures reveals that the Northwest region (Gan-
su,  Shaanxi,  Qinghai,  Ningxia,  and  Xin-
jiang) spent much less than coastal areas,
and expenditures of the latter were stagnant
or even declining in the 1990s (Table C.2).
It is not surprising that land productivity in
the Northwest region was lowest among all
regions.  The  coastal  provinces  (Guang-
dong,  Zhejiang,  Jiangsu,  and  Shangdong)
experienced the most rapid growth in agri-
culture R&D spending.
Several studies have attempted to quan-
tify the effects and returns of research in-
vestment  on  agricultural  production.  Fan
and Pardey (1997) attributed about 20 per-
cent  of  agricultural  output  growth  from
1965  to  1993  to  increased  public  invest-
ment in agricultural R&D. Rates of return
to investment estimated using different lag
structures range from 36 percent to 90 per-
cent in 1997 (Fan 2000). Huang, Rozelle,
and Rosegrant (1999) suggest that if China
increased its investment in agricultural re-
search  and  irrigation  by  4.5  percent  per
year,  it  could  become  a  net  exporter  of
grains by 2020. With every 1 percent in-
crease in agricultural research and irrigation
investment, China could produce an addi-
tional  21  million  metric  tons  of  grain  in
2010 and 36 million metric tons in 2020.
Increased agricultural production from re-
search investments has undoubtedly trick-
led down to the rural poor, although few
studies  have  quantified  their  effect  on
poverty reduction.
Irrigation
Because rainfall is concentrated during the
monsoon, China’s early civilizations devel-
oped an agricultural system that depended
21Research personnel here are defined as researchers who have at least a bachelor’s degree and one to two years
of research experience. They are commonly referred to as scientists and engineers in the Chinese system.PUBLIC CAPITAL AND INVESTMENT 21
on  water  conservation  and  irrigation.  The
Dujiang Weir in Sichuan Province, dating
from  the  third  century  B.C.,  still  supplies
water to 200, 000 hectares. During the Ming
and  Qing  dynasties,  extensive  irrigation
works were developed in the north and cen-
tral China plains.22 The greatest expansion
of irrigation facilities took place from 1953
to 1980, when the irrigated area increased
from 16 million to 45 million hectares (Ta-
ble 3.2). About 70 percent of grains as well
as most of the cotton and other cash crops
are produced on irrigated land. Many Chi-
nese rivers are tapped for irrigation, with the
Yangtze and Yellow rivers supplying much
of the country’s irrigation water through a
system of dams and reservoirs, which also
function as flood-control units. Annual us-
able supplies in the two river basins doubled
and in some cases tripled after 1949 as a
result of an ambitious program of dam con-
struction.  The  Northern  and  Northwestern
provinces  make  extensive  use  of  ground-
water. By 1997, 84,937 reservoirs, with a
storage capacity of over 458 billion cubic
meters, had been constructed.23
In terms of public investment, the gov-
ernment assigned top priority to irrigation
immediately after 1949. In 1953, govern-
ment spent 177 million yuan in irrigation
22 The Ming Dynasty lasted from 1368 to 1644; the Qing Dynasty lasted from 1644 to 1911.
23 Information in this paragraph is summarized from the annual Water and Power Yearbook of the Ministry of
Water and Power.
Table 3.2 Development of irrigation, education, and infrastructure in China, 1953–97
Rural
electricity
Irrigated Irrigated Primary Illiteracy consumption Rural
area area as school rate of Road length (hundreds of telephones
(millions of percent of enrollment agricultural (thousands of millions of (thousands
Year hectares) arable land rate (%) laborers (%) kilometers) kilowatts) of sets)
1953 22 23.25 43 n.a. 137 0.50 42
1957 27 26.17 61.7 n.a. 255 1.40 185
1962 31 32.94 56.1 n.a. 464 16.10 847
1965 33 34.67 84.7 n.a. 515 37.10 806
1970 38 38.80 84.7 n.a. 637 95.70 878
1975 43 47.60 96.8 n.a. 784 183.10 1,149
1980 45 46.12 93.9 n.a. 888 320.80 1,345
1985 44 45.87 96 27.9 942 509.20 1,498
1990 47 48.04 97.8 20.7 1028 844.50 2,474
1995 49 49.28 98.5 13.5 1157 1,655.70 8,070
1997 51 53.34 98.9 10.1 1226 1,980.10 17,866
Annual growth rate (%)
1953–80 2.69 2.57 2.93 n.a. 7.17 27.05 13.70
1980–90 0.44 0.41 0.41 n.a. 1.47 10.16 6.28
1990–97 1.17 1.51 0.16 –9.76 2.55 12.95 32.64
1953–97 1.93 1.91 1.91 n.a. 5.11 20.72 14.75
Sources: China Statistical Yearbook, China Fixed Asset Investment Yearbook, China Electronic Power Yearbook, China Water Conservancy
Yearbook, China Transportation Yearbook, China Education Yearbook, and China Science and Technology Statistical Materials.
Note: For more details about the data sources, refer to Chapter 5.investment, 10 times more than investment
in agricultural research.24The investment in
irrigation continued to increase until 1966.
Under the commune system, it was rather
easy for government to mobilize large num-
bers of rural laborers to work on the proj-
ects. As a result of this increased invest-
ment, more than 10 million hectares of land
were brought under irrigation (Table 3.2).
However, the investment increased very lit-
tle from 1976 to 1990. In fact, it declined
over 1976–89 (Table 3.1). During this pe-
riod, there was no increase in irrigated areas
in Chinese agricultural production.
In  response  to  the  grain  shortfall  and
large imports in 1994–95, the government
increased  its  investment  in  irrigation
markedly in 1996 and 1997. Among all re-
gions,  the  Northwest  accounted  for  the
largest increase in the 1990s, followed by
the Northern China Plain (Table C.2). In-
vestments in the Northeast and Southwest
remained flat during most of the 1990s. De-
spite the increased spending, irrigated areas
as a percentage of total land area increased
very  little.  The  only  exception  was  the
Northern China Plain (Table C.6). Further
expansion of irrigated areas has proved dif-
ficult because of competing industrial and
residential uses of water resources. As a re-
sult,  returns  to  irrigation  investment  may
decline in the future.
Education
The root of formal education in China dates
back  to  at  least  the  Shang  Dynasty  of
1523–1027  B.C.  Up  until  the  end  of  the
Qing Dynasty of 1644–1911, education was
limited to a privileged few, mostly for pro-
ducing government officials.
Shortly after the the Chinese Commu-
nists took power, a Soviet-type educational
system  was  imported  with  little  concern
about  the  special  features  of  the  Chinese
environment. At the time, the Soviet Union
was regarded as the new prototype for suc-
cess.  But  the  Soviet  model  was  largely
driven by technological needs; it paid little
attention to the problem of mass illiteracy
that China faced. By 1956, less than half of
primary- and secondary-aged children were
in school. Most efforts during this period
were devoted to developing and restructur-
ing higher education. As a result of this re-
structuring, the number of comprehensive
universities diminished while the number of
specialized colleges increased significantly.
The periods of the Great Leap Forward
(1958–60)  and  the  subsequent  Cultural
Revolution  (1966–76)  were  disruptive
times for Chinese society in general and its
education in particular. Educational infra-
structure was decimated as a result of the
revolutionary  struggles,  and  students  suf-
fered vastly watered-down or nonexistent
curricula. Perhaps the only gain (again at
the expense of quality) was the delivery of
elementary education to an unprecedented
number of school-aged children, largely be-
cause agricultural collectivization enabled
the creation of large numbers of “commune
schools.” These were overseen directly by
the collectives rather than by higher-level
agencies.  The  enrollment  rate  of  school-
aged children rose from 43 percent to 97 per-
cent by 1976 (Table 3.2). In 1983 more than
90 percent of rural children were enrolled in
school, only slightly less than the urban rate
of 98 percent (SSB, 1980–2000).
After  1978,  China  adopted  the  “nine-
year  compulsory  schooling”  education
policy.  That  meant  all  children  were  re-
quired  to  attend  school  for  at  least  nine
years  to  finish  both  primary  and  junior
middle school.
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24Irrigation investments here include only those directly related to irrigation, such as reservoir construction,
irrigation projects, and flood and lodging prevention. The investments in total water conservancy, which also
includes urban water supply and hydropower generation, amounted to more than 1 billion yuan in 1953, 60 times
higher than agricultural R&D investment.As a result of these efforts, the illiteracy
rate of the general population 15 years and
older dropped from 48 percent in 1970 to
less than 10 percent in 1997. In particular,
illiteracy  among  agricultural  laborers  de-
clined from 28 percent in 1985 to 10 per-
cent  in  1997  (Table  3.2). Consequently,
labor quality  improved  substantially.  This
enhanced human capital in rural areas and
provided great opportunities for farmers to
use modern farming technology and to en-
gage  in  nonfarm  activities  both  in  rural
township  and  village  enterprises  and  in
urban industrial centers.
T. Paul Schultz (1987) has shown that
increased government efforts in rural pri-
mary  education  not  only  have  large  eco-
nomic returns, but also contribute to equity
in rural areas. Although the high returns to
education in rural China were not systemat-
ically documented, anecdotal evidence sug-
gests that improved education (particularly
of  household  heads)  not  only  enhanced
farm  productivity  (Nguyen  and  Cheng
1997;  Li  and  Zhang  1998),  but  also  im-
proved farmers’ off-farm opportunities and
their  ability  to  migrate  to  urban  sectors
(Zhao 1999; Yang 1997).
In  terms  of  expenditure,  China  spent
about 2 percent of national gross domestic
product  (GDP)  on  education,  which  is
much lower than many developed countries
but higher than most developing countries.
However,  total  expenditure  on  education
may in fact be much higher because rural
education is also largely supported by rural
communities,  and  their  investment  is  not
counted in the formal government budget.
Despite extraordinary success in basic
education  in  China,  many  poor  were  not
reached by the government efforts. Official
provincial-level data presented in Table C.3
reveals  astonishing  differences  among
provinces in illiteracy rates of rural labor-
ers. Not only was illiteracy higher in the
western region, but its rate of decline there
was the lowest of all provinces. The dispar-
ity  can  be  even  greater  within  a  single
province  or  county.  According  to  official
statistics, in the poorer half of the townships
of 35 counties supported by a World Bank
project in Yunnan, Guizhou, and Guangxi,
average enrollment was at least 10 percent-
age points lower than the national average
for the same age group (Piazza and Liang
1998).  Special  household  surveys  docu-
ment even greater disparities at the village
level. The State Statistical Bureau’s (SSB)
1994 survey of 600 households in the poor-
est townships of these 35 counties showed
that the average enrollment rate for children
ages 6–12 was only 55 percent. It is there-
fore unsurprising that official statistics in
these counties indicate an average literacy
rate for the total population of only 35 per-
cent according to Piazza and Liang.
Infrastructure
Development of rural infrastructure is key
to rural social and economic life. But until
recently,  China’s  government  gave  rela-
tively low priority to rural infrastructure in
promoting  agricultural  production,  rural
nonfarm employment, and improved living
standards for the rural population.
Among  all  transportation  facilities,
roads are the most crucial to rural develop-
ment.  However,  the  mountainous  topog-
raphy in many parts of China has hindered
the  development  of  roads.  In  1953,  total
length of roads was only about 137,000 kil-
meters (Table 3.2), and road density was
about  14  kilometers per  thousand  square
kilometers, much lower than that of India
at the time.25 Moreover, government invest-
ment  in  road  construction  increased  very
little from 1953 to 1976. Nevertheless, the
length  of  roads  has  increased  gradually.
After 1985, the government geared up its
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India’s road density was 129 kilometers per thousand square kilometers in 1950.investment in roads, particularly high-quality
roads  such  as  highways  connecting  major
industrial  centers  in  coastal  areas.  Rural
roads, usually of lower quality, accounted
for about 70 percent of total road length.
In contrast to road development, one of
the  greatest  achievements  in  rural  China
was the rapid electrification of rural areas
during the past several decades. Introduc-
tion of electricity can profoundly affect vil-
lage life. Electric lighting expands the pro-
ductive and social hours in the day. Radios
and  television  provide  accessible,  afford-
able  entertainment  and  education.  Power
machinery can raise productivity and im-
prove working conditions.
In the past several decades, China gave
higher priority to electricity than to road
development  in  its  investment  portfolio.
Investment in power increased ninetyfold.
Electricity  consumption  in  rural  areas
increased  from  almost  zero  in  1950  to
198 billion kilowatts in 1997 (Table 3.2).
The  most  rapid  growth  occurred  in  the
1970s and 1980s. The percentage of vil-
lages with access to electricity was 97 per-
cent in 1996, and more than 95 percent of
households  had  an  electrical  connection
(Ministry  of  Electric  Power  1997).  This
percentage was much higher than that of
India in the same year.
Prior to 1980, growth in government in-
vestment in rural telecommunications was
very slow. Investment increased from 3 mil-
lion yuan in 1953 to 237 million yuan in
1980.  However,  large-scale  development
happened  only  in  recent  years,  with  the
number of rural telephones increasing from
3.4 million in 1992 to 17.9 million in 1997
(Table 3.2). This was largely a result of both
public and private investments in the sector.
From 1989 to 1997, public investment alone
increased more than tenfold.
But  this  trend  at  the  national  level
disguises  large  regional  differences  in
rural telecommunications development. As
Table C.5 shows, the coastal provinces like
Guangdong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Fujinag
experienced an exponential growth in the
number of rural telephone sets, while west-
ern  regions  (Northwest  and  Southwest)
showed relatively slow growth.
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Conceptual Framework and Model
T
his chapter reviews previous studies and develops a conceptual framework for the
analysis.  It  then  constructs  and  specifies  the  equations  system  based  on  previous
studies, a theoretical economic framework, and reality in rural China.
Previous Studies
This section looks at the relevant studies on growth, regional inequality, and poverty reduction
in rural China. In particular, it points out the knowledge gap in previous studies and develops
the rationale for the current study.
Sources of Growth
The outstanding performance of Chinese agriculture after the reforms of the late 1970s trig-
gered numerous studies to analyze the sources of the rapid growth. These include McMillan,
Whalley, and Zhu (1989); Fan (1991); Lin (1992); Zhang and Carter (1997); Fan and Pardey
(1997); and Huang, Rosegrant, and Rozelle (1997). Compared to the traditional accounting
approach (Solow 1957; Denison 1962), most of these studies attempt to analyze the impact of
institutional changes in addition to the increased use of inputs on production growth during
the reform period up to the early 1990s. McMillan, Whalley, and Zhu claimed that 80 percent
of the productivity growth over 1978–84 was due to institutional reforms, while 20 percent
was due to output price changes. Fan found institutional reforms accounted for 27 percent of
production growth or 63 percent of productivity growth, and technical change measured as
the residual accounted for only 16 percent of the production growth or 37 percent of the
productivity growth from 1965 to 1985. Using the percentage of households that adopted
the production responsibility system as a proxy for institutional change in his production func-
tion, Lin attributed 94 percent of the productivity growth from 1978 to 1984 to institutional
and policy reforms.
Fan and Pardey (1992) were the first to point out that omitted variables, such as research
and development (R&D) investment, biased estimates of the sources of production growth. To
address this concern, they included a research stock variable in the production function to
account for the contribution of R&D investment to the rapid production growth in addition
to the increased use of inputs and institutional changes. They found that ignoring the R&D
variable in the production function estimation led to an overstatement of the effects of institu-
tional change. Later, Huang, Rosegrant, and Rozelle (1997) used a supply function framework
to comprehensively account for the sources of growth in grain production in Chinese agriculture.
They concluded that public investment (mainly in R&D) accounted for 3 percent and 11 percent
of rice production growth for the periods 1978–84 and 1984–92, respectively. For other grains,
25public investment accounted for only 6 per-
cent of the total growth over 1978–92. For
cash  crops,  the  contribution  of  public
investment was 18 percent and 111 percent
for 1978–84 and 1984–92, respectively.
In addition to R&D investment, govern-
ment  spending  on  roads,  electrification,
education, and other public investment in
rural areas contributed to rapid growth in
agricultural  production.  Omitting  these
variables biases estimates of the production
function for Chinese agriculture as well. To
date, no studies have included a compre-
hensive set of public investment variables
in the estimation of the Chinese agricultural
production function.
Despite  the  phenomenal  development
of the rural nonfarm sector in China, few
studies  analyze  the  sources  of  growth  of
this increasingly important sector. The only
exception  is  Fan,  Zhang,  and  Robinson
(2001), which decomposed the sources of
growth into growth in capital and labor. But
this study too failed to include public in-
vestment directly as a source of growth.
Factors Affecting Regional
Inequality
A feature of the Chinese economy is the un-
even  distribution  across  regions  of  eco-
nomic growth resulting from the reforms.
The difference in growth rates between the
coastal and inland regions was as high as
3 percent during the past two decades, and
regional inequality for China as a whole in-
creased  significantly  (Kanbur  and  Zhang
1999).  China  implemented  a  coast-biased
development policy with a large portion of
public  investment  concentrated  in  the
coastal regions. It is legitimate to speculate
that the skewed distribution of public in-
vestment might be an important factor be-
hind the increased regional inequality.
Apart  from  their  role  in  promoting
growth, various types of public investment
are also key instruments for governments
to  reduce  inequality  (World Development
Report 1994). Despite the policy relevance
on  distributional  grounds,  few  studies,
except Martin (1999) and Jacoby (2000), at-
tempt  to  investigate  both  the  equity  and
growth  impact  of  public  capital.  Jacoby
found  rural  road  development  to  have  a
positive effect on growth but an ambiguous
effect on inequality in rural Nepal. Using a
theoretical two-region endogenous growth
model,  Martin  explored  the  link  between
infrastructure  and  regional  inequality.
Again, both studies consider only one spe-
cific type of public capital—roads, leaving
out other types of investment and offering
little guidance to policymakers. In the real
world,  policymakers  are  more  concerned
about  the  magnitude  and  directions  of
growth and distributional effects of various
public investment instruments so as to tar-
get their investments more efficiently.
Many studies focus on rural inequality in
China  (Lyons  1991;  Tsui  1991;  Rozelle
1994; Yang 1999; and Kanbur and Zhang
1999). Rozelle decomposed inequality (Gini
coefficient) into different sources of income.
Using  the  county-level  data  from  Jiangsu
province, he revealed that the changing pat-
terns of inequality were closely associated
with the changes in the structure of the rural
economy.  In  particular,  policies  that  in-
creased the importance of agriculture in the
economy  led  to  reduced  inequality;  those
that simulated the expansion of rural indus-
try gave rise to greater inequality.
From  a  different  angle,  Kanbur  and
Zhang  decomposed  overall  regional  in-
equality in China into inequality between
rural  and  urban  and  between  inland  and
coastal. Their study generated two impor-
tant findings. On one hand, the contribution
of rural-urban inequality to overall regional
inequality  was  much  higher  than  that  of
inland-coastal. On the other hand, inland-
coastal inequality increased its contribution,
while rural-urban inequality changed very
little over time.
All these studies focus on measures of
inequality decomposed by income sources
(such as farm and nonfarm) or regions (such
as  developed  versus  less  developed,  rural
versus  urban).  None  try  to  link  regional
26 CHAPTER 4inequality  to  public  investment.  Since  re-
gional inequality has been driven mainly by
natural  resource  endowments  and  govern-
ment policies, information on the impact of
government  policies,  particularly  invest-
ment  policies,  could  provide  meaningful
insights for policymakers in their attempts
to achieve equity goals more efficiently.
Causes of Poverty Reduction
Approaches  to  reducing  poverty  evolved
over the past 50 years in response to the
deepening understanding of the complexity
of development. In the 1950s and 1960s,
many viewed large investments in physical
capital  and  infrastructure  as  the  primary
means of development. In the 1970s, aware-
ness grew  that  physical  capital  was  not
enough; at least as important were health
and education. The World Bank articulated
this  understanding  in  its World Develop-
ment Report 1980, arguing  that  improve-
ments in health and education were impor-
tant not only in their own right but also to
promote growth in poor people’s incomes.
The 1980s saw another shift of empha-
sis  following  the  debt  crisis  and  global
recession and the contrasting experiences
of  East  Asia  and  Latin  America,  South
Asia,  and  Africa.  Emphasis  was  placed
on economic management rather than the
play of market forces. The World Develop-
ment Report 1990 (World Bank) proposed
a two-part strategy: promote labor-intensive
growth  through  economic  openness  and
investment  in  infrastructure  and  provide
basic services to poor people in health and
education.  In  the  1990s  governance  and
institutions moved toward center stage—
as did issues of vulnerability at the local
and national levels.
The World Development Report 2000
(World  Bank)  proposed  a  three-pronged
strategy  for  attacking  poverty:  promote
opportunity,  facilitate  empowerment,  and
enhance security. This meant more access
for the poor to jobs, credit, roads, electricity,
markets for produce, schools, water, sanita-
tion, and health services. State and social
institutions were to be responsive and ac-
countable to poor people. Meanwhile, poor
people’s vulnerability to economic shocks,
natural disasters, ill health, disability, and
personal violence was to be reduced, as this
was  seen  as  intrinsic  to  enhancing  well-
being  and  encouraging  investment  in
human  capital  and  in  higher-risk,  higher-
return activities. The key message of this
strategy is that public investment, and its
associated institutions and policies, in infra-
structure,  education,  technology,  health,
and  other  social  services  is  necessary
in  order  to  reduce  poverty  by  enhancing
opportunities for the poor to develop and
to empower and protect themselves.
But  governments  in  many  developing
countries face tight budgets. They desper-
ately need information such as the number
of  poor  that  they  can  raise  above  the
poverty line per unit of additional invest-
ment in specific areas. For example, should
government  spend  more  on  infrastruc-
ture, education, or agricultural R&D, and
in which region?
Few studies analyze the causes behind
the  rapid  reduction  of  rural  poverty  in
China. A 1992 World Bank country study
was the first comprehensive analysis on the
incidence and correlates of rural poverty in
China. That study concluded that rural eco-
nomic reforms contributed tremendously to
the rapid reduction in rural poverty and that
poverty is now almost entirely restricted to
resource-constrained, remote uplands.
In more recent years, Ravallion at the
World  Bank  used  rural  household  survey
data to lead a re-estimation of the incidence
of poverty and changes over time in four
provinces in Southwest China. Researchers
devoted great effort to constructing a panel
dataset at the household level from 1985 to
1990 (Chen and Ravallion 1996). Analyses
from this panel dataset revealed that con-
sumption  variability  accounts  for  a  large
share of observed poverty and is likely to
severely constrain efforts to reach the long-
term poor (Jalan and Ravallion 1997a, b,
and c). They thus saw effective insurance
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for alleviating the persistent problem of in-
equality.  Jalan  and  Ravallion  (2000)  also
found robust evidence of geographic pov-
erty  traps  in  their  farm  household  data,
illustrating the importance of public invest-
ment in lagging poor areas to improve effi-
ciency and equity.
Gustafsson and Li (1998) analyzed the
structure of Chinese poverty in 1988. One
significant  finding  from  this  study  was
that  the  rural  poor  are  not  only  in  remote
resource-poor areas, in contrast to the 1992
World  Bank  study.  This  implies  that  even
resource-rich  areas  can  have  substantial
numbers of poor if infrastructure and tech-
nologies do not reach them. Using a small
sample  of  500  rural  households,  Wu,
Richardson,  and  Travers  (1996)  attributed
rural poverty to low levels of factor endow-
ment, immobility of labor, and demographic
characteristics of households. They indicated
that  improved  infrastructure  and  education
might help the poor to participate in the labor
market and to set up nonfarm businesses.
Khan (1997) updated data on the trend
and pattern of Chinese poverty. One contri-
bution of his study was to adjust the poverty
measures at the provincial level—and his
measures were vastly different from those
of  the  Chinese  government.  But  Khan’s
sample was small and may not be represen-
tative for all China.
Rozelle,  Zhang,  and  Huang  (2000)
comprehensively  reviewed  government
policies regarding poor-area development.
They concluded that such policies gener-
ally failed to further reduce rural poverty
in poor areas.26 Moreover, they found high
inefficiency  and  mistargeting  of  govern-
ment poverty loans.
Most of these studies hint at the impor-
tant role of public capital, particularly pub-
lic infrastructure, in rural poverty reduction.
But they fail to explicitly link public invest-
ment and poverty reduction. More impor-
tantly,  most  ignore  the  fact  that  different
types of investments at different locations
may  have  substantially  different  poverty-
reduction outcomes. This study aims to fill
the knowledge gap by empirically analyz-
ing how government policies, particularly
the  allocation  of  public  investment,  con-
tributed to poverty reduction in rural China.
Model
As  reviewed  in  the  previous  section,  nu-
merous studies have examined the sources
of growth and changes in income distribu-
tion in rural China. One significant feature
of this previous work is the use of a single-
equation approach. There are at least two
disadvantages to this method. First, many
poverty and inequality determinants, such as
income, production or productivity growth,
prices,  wages,  and  nonfarm  employment,
are  generated  from  the  same  economic
process as inequality and poverty. In other
words, these variables are also endogenous
variables. Ignoring this characteristic leads to
biased estimates of the poverty and inequal-
ity effects. Second, certain economic variables
affect poverty and inequality through multi-
ple channels. For example, improved rural
infrastructure reduces rural poverty not only
through  improved  growth  in agricultural
production but also through improved wages
and opportunities for nonfarm employment.
It is very difficult to capture these different
effects using a single-equation approach.
Building on previous studies, this study
develops a simultaneous equations model
to estimate the various effects of govern-
ment expenditure on production, inequality,
and  poverty  through  different  channels.
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26They use a data set from 43 poor counties in Shaanxi provinces over 1986–91 and an econometric model to
assess how government investment in poverty alleviation affects growth in agriculture, township and village en-
terprise, and county-run enterprise. They found that poverty funds directly allocated to households for agricul-
tural activity had a significant positive effect on growth, while investment in township and village enterprise or
county state-owned enterprise did not have a discernible effect on growth.Figure 4.1 portrays the conceptual frame-
work for the model, and equations (1) to
(11) give the formal structure of the system.
Table 4.1 pre-sents the definition of vari-
ables. The equations can be grouped into
three blocks. The first block is a poverty
equation (equation 1); the second block is
productivity, wages, and employment equa-
tions (equations 2 to 5); and the third block
models  the  relationship  between  govern-
ment spending and public capitals and pres-
ents a terms-of-trade equation.
Equation (1) models the determinants of
rural  poverty  (P).27 Determinants  include
agricultural  GDP  per  agricultural  laborer
(AGDPPC), the rural nonfarm daily wage
(WAGE),  nonagricultural  employment
(NAGEMPLY), the domestic terms of trade
for agriculture (TT), growth in rural popula-
tion (APOP), and a three-year lagged mov-
ing average of per capita government spend-
ing on poverty alleviation loans (PLOAN).
Agricultural GDP per worker is included as
a variable in the poverty equation because
agricultural income still accounts for a sub-
stantial share of total income among rural
households. Even in 1997, the percentage
was as high as 64 percent. In less developed
areas, this percentage is even higher (often
over 90 percent).
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27All  variables  without  subscripts  indicate  observations  in  year t at  the  provincial  level.  For  presentation
purposes, the authors omit the subscript. The variables with subscript “ –1, . . . –j” indicate observations in
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Table 4.1 Definitions of exogenous and endogenous variables
Variable Definition
Exogenous variable
LANDPC Land area per worker
AKPC Agricultural capital per worker
NAKPC Capital per worker in rural nonagricultural sector
APOP Rural population growth
UGDP GDP produced by the urban sector
IRE Government expenditure on irrigation, both from
revenue and capital accounts
RDE Government spending (both revenue and capital) on
agricultural R&D
ROADE Government investment and spending on rural roads
EDE Government spending on rural education
RTRE Government spending on rural telecommunications
PWRE Government spending on rural power
PLOAN Government expenditures for poverty alleviation per
capita, measured as last three years moving average
RAIN Annual rainfall
Endogenous variable
P Percentage of rural population below poverty line
SCHY Average years of schooling of rural population
15 years and older
ROADS Road density in rural areas
IR Percentage of total cropped area that is irrigated 
ELECT Electricity consumption
RTR Rural telephone
WAGE Wage rate of nonagricultural labor in rural areas
NAGEMPLY Percentage of nonagricultural employment in total rural
employment
AGDPPC Agricultural GDP per laborer
AGDPPCn Agricultural productivity growth at the national level
NAGDPPC Nonagricultural GDP per worker in rural areas
TT Terms of trade, measured as agricultural prices divided
by a relevant nonagricultural GNP deflatorCONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND MODEL 31
Nonfarm employment income is the sec-
ond most important source of income after
agricultural production for rural residents in
China. The wage and number of nonfarm la-
borers are good proxies for nonfarm income.
Moreover, we can distinguish the differential
impacts of changes in wages and number of
workers  in  the  nonfarm  sector  on  rural
poverty reduction. These differential impacts
may have important policy implications for
further poverty reduction. If improvement in
rural wages reduces rural poverty more than
increased rural nonfarm employment does,
then  government  resources  should  be  tar-
geted to improve rural wages, or vice versa.
The  terms-of-trade  variable  measures
the impact on rural poverty of changes in
agricultural  prices  relative  to  nonagricul-
tural prices. Price policy can have a large
effect on the rural poor. We hypothesize that
in the short run the poor may suffer from
higher agricultural prices if they are usually
net  buyers  of  food  grains.  But  they  may
gain from higher prices if they are net sell-
ers of agricultural products. In the long run,
however, increased agricultural prices may
induce  government  and  farmers  to  invest
more in agricultural production, shifting the
supply curve outward.28 Population growth
also affects rural poverty since fast growth
Block 1: Poverty Equation
P = f(AGDPPC, WAGE, NAGEMPLY, TT, APOP–1, PLOAN) (1)
Block 2: Productivity, Wages, and Employment Equations
AGDPPC = f(LANDPC, AKPC, RDE, RDE–1, . . . IR, SCHY, ROADS, ELECT, RTR) (2)
NAGDPPC = f(NAKPC, SCHY ROADS, ELECT, RTR) (3)
WAGE = f(ROADS, SCHY, RTR, ELECT, APOP–1, AGDPPC–1, UGDP–1) (4)
NAGEMPLY = f(ROADS, SCHY, ELECT, RTR, AGDPPC–1, UGDP–1) (5)
Block 3: Investment and Price Equations
IR = f(IRE, IRE–1, . . . , IRE–j) (6)
ROADS = f(ROADE, ROADE–1, . . . , ROADE–k) (7)
SCHY = f(EDE, EDE–1, . . . , EDE–m) (8)
RTR = f(RTRE, RTRE–1, . . . , RTRE–1) (9)
ELECT = f(PWRE, PWRE–1, . . . , PWRE–n) (10)
TT = f(AGDPPC, AGDPPCn) (11)
28This is a traditional induced innovation theory proposed by Hayami and Ruttan (1985).32 CHAPTER 4
in population may increase rural poverty if
there is insufficient growth in rural employ-
ment. This is particularly important for a
country like China in which resources are
limited and the population base is large.
Public spending on rural poverty loans
has been a major policy instrument for the
government to reduce poverty. For example,
in 1996 such loans accounted for 82 per-
cent  of  total  government  spending  on
poverty  alleviation.29 Since  these  funds
often take time to affect rural poverty, we
use  a  moving  average  of  the  past  three
years’ spending in our regression.
Block 2 equations consist of two neo-
classical productivity functions for agricul-
tural and nonagricultural activities in rural
China  and  wage  and  employment  equa-
tions derived from labor demand and wage
determination in a competitive labor mar-
ket. For the agricultural productivity func-
tion  (equation  [2]),  labor  productivity  is
the dependent variable, while independent
variables  include  land  and  capital  per
worker (LANDPC and AKPC) as conven-
tional inputs. The following supply shifter
variables  capture  the  direct  impact  of
technology,  infrastructure,  and  education
on agricultural labor productivity growth:
current  and  lagged government  spending
on  agricultural research  and  extension
(RDE, RDE–1,…, RD–i), percentage of irri-
gated  cropped  area  in  total  cropped  area
(IR), average years of schooling of rural pop-
ulation (SCHY), road density (ROADS), per
capita agricultural electricity consumption
(ELECT),  and  number  of  rural  telephone
sets per thousand rural residents (RTR).
For  the  nonagricultural  productivity
function (equation [3]), the dependent vari-
able is nonagricultural (township and vil-
lage  enterprise)  GDP  labor  productivity
(NAGDPPC).  Independent  variables  are
capital  per  worker  (NAKPC),  workers’
years of schooling, and infrastructure. Equa-
tions (2) and (3) are also used to analyze the
sources  of  changes  in  regional  inequality.
Equations 4 and 5 are wages and em-
ployment  determination  functions  in  the
rural nonfarm sector. These equations are
reduced forms of labor supply and demand,
where  equilibrium  wages  clear  the  labor
market. The derived labor and wages are a
function of labor productivity. Labor pro-
ductivity  in  turn  is  a  function  of  capital/
labor ratio and production shifters such as
infrastructure and improvements in educa-
tion. Therefore, final labor and wage equa-
tions  are  functions  of  capital/labor  ratios
and production shifters. However, when we
include capital/labor ratio in our model, the
coefficients are not statistically significant.
We therefore drop them from the equations.
This may be because in the long run, capital/
labor ratio does not significantly impact ei-
ther wages or nonfarm employment. Growth
in the urban sector (UGDP–1) is included to
control for the effects of urban growth on
rural wages and nonfarm employment.
The rest of the equations are grouped in
Block 3, which models the relationships be-
tween  physical  infrastructure  levels  and
past government expenditures for different
items and presents a terms-of-trade deter-
mination equation. Equation 6 defines the
relationship between the share of cropped
29The central funds for poverty alleviation come from three different government sources. The largest portion is
from the poverty loans managed by the Agricultural Development Bank, which usually have zero or very low
interest rates. The second largest portion comes from the State Development and Planning Commission, called
employment scheme funds. Repayment of these funds is not required and they are usually used to hire rural poor
for public work. The third portion comes from the Ministry of Finance and is called development funds. Repay-
ment of these funds is also not required and they are usually used for poor-region development. According to the
Statistical Yearbook of the China Agricultural Development Bank (SSB 1997), in 1996 government spending on
poverty loans amounted to19.9 billion yuan, on the employment scheme 3.12 billion yuan, and on development
funds 1.3 billion yuan.areas irrigated and current and past govern-
ment spending on irrigation (IRE, IRE–1,...
IRE–j); equation 7 defines the relationship
between road density and current and past
government  spending  on  rural  roads
(ROADE, ROADE–1,... ROADE–k);  equa-
tion  8  defines  the  relationship  between
average years of schooling of rural popu-
lation and current and past government ex-
penditures on education (EDU, EDU–1,...
EDU–m); equation 9 models the relationship
between the number of rural telephones and
government expenditures on telecommun-
ications (RTRE, RTRE–1,... RTRE–l); and
equation 10 models the relationship between
the consumption of electricity (ELECT) and
government  spending  on  power  (PWRE,
PWRE–1,...PWRE–n).
Equation 11 determines the agricultural
terms of trade. Growth in agricultural pro-
ductivity at the province and national level
(AGDPPCn) increases the supply of agricul-
tural products and thus reduces agricultural
prices.  The  inclusion  of  national  produc-
tivity growth reduces any upward bias in
the  estimation  of  the  poverty  alleviation
effects of government spending within each
province, since production growth in other
provinces will also contribute to lower food
prices through the national market. Initially,
we also included some demand-side vari-
ables in the equation such as population and
income growth. But they were not signifi-
cant and so were dropped.
As  Chapter  3  discussed,  institutional
changes  and  policy  reforms  made  large
contributions to the rapid growth in agricul-
tural and nonagricultural production and to
poverty  reduction  in  China’s  rural  areas.
This study does not aim to quantify these
effects,  as  previous  studies  have  already
done  so  (Fan  1991;  Lin  1992;  Fan  and
Pardey 1997). However, in order to reduce
or eliminate the estimation bias from omit-
ting these effects in our model estimation,
we add year dummies in all equations to
capture  the  year-specific  institutional  and
policy  changes  on  growth  in  agricultural
and  nonagricultural  production  and  on
poverty  reduction.  This  specification  is
more flexible than in Fan and in Fan and
Pardey, which use time-period dummies to
capture the effects of institutional change
on production growth. Regional dummies






By totally differentiating equations 1 to 11,
we  can  derive  the  marginal  impact  and
elasticities  of  different  types  of  govern-
ment expenditures on growth in agricul-
tural  and  nonfarm  productivity  and  on
reductions in regional inequality and rural
poverty.
Growth Effects
As  an  example,  the  marginal  impact  of
R&D investments in year t–i on agricultural
labor productivity in year t can be derived as
∂AGDPPC/∂RDE–i =
∂AGDPPC/∂RDE–i. (12)
Equation (12) measures the direct im-
pact of investment in research on agricul-
tural productivity growth. By aggregating
the total effects of all past government ex-
penditures over the lag period, the sum of
marginal effects is obtained for any particu-
lar year. Returns to investment in irrigation
can be derived similarly.
As another example, the returns to ex-
penditures on roads in nonfarm labor pro-




The  impact  of  government  investment  in
agricultural R&D in year t–i on poverty at
year t can be derived as
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∂P/∂RDE–i =( ∂P/∂AGDPPC) (∂AGDPPC/∂RDE–i)
+( ∂P/∂WAGE) (∂WAGE/∂AGDPPC) (∂AGDPPC/∂RDE–i)
+( ∂P/∂NAGEMPLY) (∂NAGEMPLY/∂AGDPPC) (∂AGDPPC/∂RDE–i)
+( ∂P/∂TT) (∂TT/∂AGDPPC) (∂AGDPPC/∂RDE–i). (14)
The first term on the right-hand side of equation 14 captures the impact on poverty of
government investments in R&D through yield-enhancing technologies such as improved
varieties, and therefore agricultural labor productivity. Increased agricultural labor productiv-
ity also affects poverty through changes in rural nonfarm wages and employment and relative
prices, which are captured in the remaining terms on the right of the equation.
As with government investments in agricultural R&D, the impact of government invest-
ments  in  irrigation  is  captured  through  improved  productivity,  rural  wages  and  nonfarm
employment, and relative prices.










The first term on the right side of equa-
tion 15 measures the direct effects on pov-
erty of improved productivity attributable
to greater road density. Terms 2, 3, and 4
are the indirect effects of improved produc-
tivity  through  changes  in  rural  nonfarm
wages, employment, and prices. Terms 5
and 6 capture the direct effects on poverty
of higher nonfarm wages and greater non-
agricultural employment opportunities aris-
ing from government investment in roads.
We can similarly derive the impact on rural
poverty of increased investment in telecom-
munications, electricity, and education.
Impact on Regional Inequality
To  decompose  the  sources  of  changes  in
regional  inequality  of  labor  productivity,
we  consider  equations  (2)  and  (3)  in  the
following double-log form:
(16)
where all the variables are in logarithms, y
is the dependent variable and xi represents a
set of independent variables. An error term
ε is added to represent stochastic shocks to
output and is assumed to be unrelated to
y = a +∑βixi+ ε,
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where σ2 (y) is the variance of y and cov(y,• )
represents the covariance of y with other
variables. Since none of the variables on
the right side of equation 16 is correlated
with the error term, the covariance of y and
ε is equal to the variance of ε. Considering
that y is already in logarithmic form, is a
standard inequality measure known as the
logarithmic variance (Cowell 1995), hav-
ing  the  property  of  invariance  to  scale.
According  to  Shorrocks,  the  covariance
terms  on  the  right  side  of  17  can  be  re-
garded  as  the  contributions  of  the  factor
components to total inequality.
Using estimates from equations 2 and 3
and  applying  the  above  decomposition
method, we can quantify the contributions
of various public investments on regional
inequality in both agricultural and nonagri-
cultural labor productivities. Moreover, we
can calculate the impact of public invest-
ments on regional inequality in total labor
productivity. For this purpose, we further
write total rural labor productivity as
Y = a1Y1 + a2Y2, (18)
where Y, Y1, and Y2 are total, agricultural,
and nonagricultural productivities, respec-
tively; a1 and a2 are, respectively, the shares
of agricultural and nonagricultural laborers
in total labor. Under six axioms proposed
by Shorrocks, a broad class of inequality
measures  such  as  Gini  coefficient,  the
Atkinson index, and the logarithmic vari-
ance index can be written as
If we still use the logarithmic variance as an
inequality measure, then we can substitute
the estimated variance for Y1 and Y2 from
17  into  19  to  obtain  the  contributions  of
public inputs to total inequality.
(17)
the  other  variables.  Following  Shorrocks














βicov(y,xi)+ σ 2 (ε),
I(Y) = s1I(a1Y1) + s2I(a2Y2),
s1=
cov(Y,a1Y1)
σ 2(Y) σ 2(Y)
cov(Y,a2Y2)
s2= ,.CHAPTER 5
Data, Estimation, and Results
T
his chapter describes the data and discusses the estimation technique and estimation re-
sults. It further details the calculation and analysis of the marginal returns derived from
additional units of expenditure on various types of public capitals and in different regions.
Data
Poverty
There are several estimates of rural poverty in China. Official statistics indicate that the num-
ber of poor declined to about 50 million by 1997 (MOA, China Agricultural Development
Report 1998). World Bank estimates (Piazza and Liang 1998) are similar to Chinese official
statistics. A third set of estimates, based on a much higher poverty line (Ravallion and Chen
1997), shows a far greater proportion of the total population subject to poverty, with a poverty
incidence of 60 percent in 1978 and 22 percent in 1995. However, the declining trend of rural
poverty in this last set of estimates is steeper than that in the official Chinese statistics. Khan,
using samples of the household survey, obtained 35.1 percent for 1988 and 28.6 percent for
1995.30 Although these poverty rates are higher than the official rates, the change over time
differs little from the official statistics.
The present study uses provincial-level poverty data from official sources. Few scholars
have reported their estimates by province. Khan estimated provincial poverty indicators (both
head count ratio and poverty gap index) for 1988 and 1995 using the household survey data.
To test the sensitivity of our estimated results, we first used both official statistics and Khan’s
estimates, obtaining similar results, largely because the two sets of poverty figures share
similar trends. Our final results are based on the official data simply because poverty data are
available by province for more years.
Agricultural and Nonagricultural GDP
Both nominal gross domestic product (GDP) and real GDP growth indices for various sectors
are available from the The Gross Domestic Product of China (SSB 1997a). Data sources and
construction of national GDP estimates were also published by the State Statistical Bureau
(SSB)  in Calculation Methods of China’s Annual GDP (SSB  1997b).  According  to  this
publication, the SSB used the U.N. standard SNA (system of national accounts) definitions to
estimate GDP for 29 provinces by three economic sectors (primary, secondary, and tertiary) in
30The dataset included 10,258 rural households in 1998 and 7,998 in 1995.
36mainland  China  for  the  period  1952–95.
Since 1995, the China Statistical Yearbook
has published GDP data every year for each
province by the same three sectors. Both
nominal and real growth rates are available
from SSB publications.
The agricultural sector is equivalent to
the primary sector used by the SSB. We use
the following procedures to construct GDP
for the nonagricultural sector in rural areas:
Until 1996, China published the value of
annual gross production for rural industry
and services. In 1996, it began to publish
value-added figures. The definition of value
added is equivalent to the GDP data. The
Ministry of Agriculture published data on
both  gross  production  value  and  value
added  for  rural  industry  (including  con-
struction) and services in the China Agri-
cultural Yearbook 1996. The data on nomi-
nal value added for rural industry and serv-
ices  prior  to  1995  were  estimated  using
the growth rate of gross production value
and  1995  value-added  figures,  assuming
no change in the ratio of value added to
gross production value.
GDP for rural industry was subtracted
from GDP for industry as a whole (or the
secondary sector as classified by the SSB)
to obtain GDP for urban industry. Similarly,
GDP for rural services was subtracted from
the  aggregate  service  sector  GDP  (or  the
tertiary sector as classified by the SSB) to
obtain  GDP  for  the  urban  service  sector.
GDP for rural enterprise is the sum of GDP
for rural industry and rural services.
The implicit GDP deflators by province
for the three sectors are estimated by divid-
ing nominal GDP by real GDP. These de-
flators  are  then  used  to  deflate  nominal
GDP for rural industry and services to ob-
tain their GDP in real terms.
Labor
Agricultural  labor  is  measured  in  stock
terms as the number of persons engaged in
agricultural production at the end of each
year. The data prior to 1978 were avail-
able  in  the  SSB’s Historical Statistical
Materials for Provinces, Autonomous Re-
gions and Municipalities (1949–1990).
The data after 1977 were taken from vari-
ous issues of the China Agricultural Year-
book (MOA), the China Statistical Year-
book (SSB), and the China Rural Statisti-
cal Yearbook (SSB).
The labor input for the nonfarm sector is
calculated  simply  by  subtracting  agricul-
tural labor from total rural labor.
Capital Stock
Capital stocks for the agricultural and non-
agricultural sectors in rural areas are calcu-
lated from data on gross capital formation
and annual fixed asset investment. For the
three  sectors  classified,  the  SSB  (1997)
published data on gross capital formation
by province after 1978. Gross capital for-
mation is defined as the value of fixed as-
sets and inventory acquired minus the value
of fixed assets and inventory disposed. To
construct a capital stock series from data on
capital formation, we use the following pro-
cedure: define the capital stock in time t as
the stock in time t–1 plus investment minus
depreciation,
Kt = It + (1–δ)Kt–1, (20)
where Kt is the capital stock in year t, It is
gross capital formation in year t, and δis the
depreciation  rate. China Statistical Year-
book (SSB 1995) reports the depreciation
rate  of  fixed  assets  of  state-owned  enter-
prises  for  industry,  railways,  communica-
tions, commerce, and grain for the period
1952–92. We  use  the  rates  for  grain  and
commerce  for  agriculture  and  services,
respectively.  After  1992,  the  SSB  ceased
to  report  official  depreciation  rates.  For
the  years  after  1992  we  used  the  1992
depreciation rates.
To obtain initial values for the capital
stock, we used a procedure similar to Kohli
(1982).  That  is,  we  assume  that  prior  to
1978 real investment grew at a steady rate
(r), which is assumed to be the same as the
rate of growth of real GDP from 1952 to
1977. Thus,
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value of the capital stock is independent of
the  1978–95  data  used  in  our  analysis.
Moreover, given the relatively small capital
stock in 1978 and the high levels of invest-
ment, the estimates for later years are not
sensitive to the 1978 benchmark value of
the capital stock.
Estimates of capital stocks for rural in-
dustry  and  services  are  constructed  using
the annual fixed asset investment by prov-
ince from 1978 to 1995. These are from the
China  Statistical  Yearbook  (SSB,  various
years)  and  the China Fixed Asset Invest-
ment Statistical Materials, 1950–95 (SSB,
1996).  Initial  values  are  calculated  using
equation  21,  but  the  growth  rate  of  real
investment prior to 1978 is assumed to be
4 percent. Again, the initial capital stock is
low so the estimated series is not sensitive
to the benchmark starting value.
Capital stock for rural industry is sub-
tracted from that of total industry (or sec-
ondary industry as classified by the SSB) to
obtain capital stock for the urban industrial
sector.  Similarly,  capital  stock  for  rural
services  is  subtracted  from  the  aggregate
service sector (or tertiary sector as classi-
fied by the SSB) to obtain the capital stock
for the urban service sector. Finally, capital
stock for rural enterprise is the sum of cap-
ital stocks for rural industry and services.
Prior to constructing capital stocks for
each sector, annual data on capital forma-
tion and fixed asset investment was deflated
by a capital investment deflator. The SSB
began to publish provincial price indices for
fixed  asset  investment  in  1987.  Prior  to
1987,  we  use  the  national  price  index  of




Public  investment  in  agricultural  R&D  is
accounted for in the total national science
and technology budget. The sources of agri-
cultural R&D investment are different gov-
ernment agencies. Science and technology
commissions at different levels of govern-
ment allocate funds to national, provincial,
and prefectural institutes, primarily as core
support. These funds are mainly used by in-
stitutes to cover researchers’ salaries, bene-
fits,  and  administrative  expenses.  Project
funds come primarily from other sources, in-
cluding departments of agriculture, research
foundations, and international donors. Re-
cently, revenues generated from commercial
activities (development income) became an
important source of revenue for the research
institutes.  The  research  expenditures  re-
ported in this study include only those ex-
penses used to directly support agricultural
research. The data reported here are from
Fan and Pardey (1992) and various publica-
tions  from  the  Government  Science  and
Technology  Commission  and  the  State
Statistical  Bureau.  Research  expenditures
and personnel numbers include those from
research institutions at national, provincial,
and prefectural levels, as well as agricultural
universities (only the research part).
When  calculating  returns  to  R&D  in-
vestment, expenditures on agricultural re-
search as well as extension at the national
and  sub-national  levels  are  used  as  total
R&D  spending.  This  implicitly  assumes
that research conducted at the national level
affects each province’s production in pro-
portion to the province’s research expendi-
tures,  and  the  impact  of  extension  con-
ducted in each province is proportional to
research impact.
Irrigation Expenditures
Provincial  irrigation  expenditures  refer  to
total government fiscal expenditures in con-
struction  of  reservoirs,  irrigation  and
drainage  systems,  and  flood  and  lodging
prevention, as well as maintenance of these
systems. However, government reports of
such data are available only after 1980 in
the China Water Conservancy Yearbook




. I1978of Water Conservancy reported total expen-
diture (not by item) on reservoirs, irrigation
and  drainage  systems,  flood  and  lodging
prevention, water supply, and hydropower
(Ministry of Water Conservancy 1980). This
spending item is much broader than irriga-
tion, as it also includes urban water supply,
flood control, and hydropower generation.
To  calculate  the  cost  solely  of  irrigation
prior to 1979, we use the percentage of irri-
gation  spending  in  total  expenditures  on
water conservancy in 1980.
Education Expenditures
Provincial  expenditures  for  primary-  and
middle-school education in rural areas after
1990 are reported in the China Education
Yearbook (Ministry  of  Education,  various
years) and the China Education Expendi-
ture Yearbook (SSB). Expenditures prior to
1990 are extrapolated using the percentage
of rural students in total students. Since edu-
cation expenditure per student in urban areas
is higher than that in rural areas, we use the
cost difference in 1990 to adjust down the
total education expenditures in rural areas.
Road Expenditures
Road  expenditures  are  reported  in China
Fixed Asset Investment Statistical Materi-
als, 1950–95 (SSB  1996)  and  the China
Transportation Yearbook (Ministry of Trans-
portation, various years). However, there is
no breakdown between rural and urban road
expenditures. We use the percentage of the
length of rural roads in total length of roads
to  extrapolate  the  cost  of  rural  roads  by
assuming the unit cost of rural road con-
struction  is  one  third  that  of  urban  roads
(Ministry of Transportation 1995).
Power Expenditures
Provincial power expenditures are available
in China Fixed Asset Investment Statistical
Materials, 1950–95 (SSB  1996)  and  the
China Power Yearbook (Ministry of Elec-
tric Power, various years). We use the unit
cost of electricity per kilowatt to calculate
power expenditures for rural areas.
Telecommunications Expenditures
Telecommunications expenditures by prov-
ince  are  available  in China Fixed Asset
Investment Statistical Materials, 1950–95
(SSB 1996) and of the China Transporta-
tion Yearbook (Ministry of Transportation,
various years). However, similar to expen-
ditures  on  roads  and  power,  there  is  no
breakdown between rural and urban expen-
ditures. We use the number of telephones in
rural and urban areas to extrapolate the cost
of rural telecommunications.
Rural Education
We use the percentage of population with
different  education  levels  to  calculate  the
average years of schooling as our education
variable, assuming 0 years for a person who
is illiterate or semi-illiterate, 5 years for pri-
mary-school education, 8 years for a junior
high-school education, 12 years for a high-
school education, 13 years for a professional-
school education, and 16 years for college
and above education. The population census
and the Ministry of Education report educa-
tion levels for population above age 7.
Roads
The road variable is measured as road den-
sity, road length in kilometers per thousand
square kilometers of geographic area. The
length of total roads by province is reported
in the China Statistical Yearbook (SSB, var-
ious years) and the China Transportation
Yearbook (Ministry  of  Transportation),
while the length of rural roads in the 1980s
is reported in of the China Rural Statistical
Yearbook (SSB, various years). In more re-
cent years, the China Rural Statistical Year-
book stopped  reporting  rural  roads.  We
therefore  use  the  trend  of  total  length  of
roads (except highways) to extrapolate the
length of rural roads for the years in which
data are not available.
Electricity
Total rural electricity consumption for both
production and residential uses by province
are available in of the China Rural Statisti-
DATA, ESTIMATION, AND RESULTS 3940 CHAPTER 5
cal Yearbook and  the China Agricultural
Yearbook (MOA).  In  more  recent  years,
the  China  Rural  Energy  Yearbook  (SSB,
various  years)  (MOA  1995–2000)  began
publishing the use of electricity separately
for  residential  and  production  purposes
by province. We use this newly available
information  to  backcast  the  different  use
by province for earlier years.
Rural Telephony
Number  of  rural  telephones  is  used  as  a
proxy  for  the  development  of  rural  tele-
communications. The number of rural tele-
phones by province is published in of the
China Rural Statistical Yearbook (SSB,
various years), the China Statistical Year-
book (SSB, various years), and the China
Transportation Yearbook (Ministry of Trans-
portation, various years).
Model Estimation
Functional Form and Estimation
Procedure
We use double-log functional forms for all
equations in the system. More flexible func-
tional forms such as translog or quadratic
impose fewer restrictions on estimated pa-
rameters, but many coefficients are not sta-
tistically significant due to multicollinearity
problems  among  various  interaction  vari-
ables. For the system equations, we use the
full information maximum-likelihood esti-
mation technique.
Since our provincial poverty data are
available only for seven years (1985–89,
1991, and 1996) a two-step procedure is
used  in  estimating  the  full  equations
system. The first step involves estimating
all  the  equations  except  for  the  poverty
equation  using  the  provincial-level  data
from  1970  to  1997.  Then  the  values  of
AGDPPC, WAGE, and NAGEMPLY and
TT at  the  pro-vincial  level  are  predicted
using the estimated parameters. The sec-
ond  step  estimates  the  poverty  equation
using the predicted values of the independ-
ent variables at the provincial level based
on the available poverty data for 1985–89,
1991, and 1996. The advantage of this pro-
cedure is to fully use the information avail-
able for all non-poverty equations, thereby
increasing the reliability of estimates and
avoiding the endogeneity problem of the
poverty equation.
Lags and Distribution of
Public Investments
Government  investments  in  R&D,  roads,
education, power, telecommunications, and
irrigation  can  have  long  lead  times  in
affecting agricultural production, and their
effects can be long term once they kick in.
Thus, one of the thornier problems to resolve
when  including  government  investment
variables  in  a  production  or  productivity
function concerns the choice of appropriate
lag structure. Most past studies use stock
variables, which are usually weighted aver-
ages of current and past government expen-
ditures on certain investments such as R&D.
But what weights and how many years’ lag
should be used in the aggregation are under
debate.31 Since  the  shape  and  length  of
these investments are largely unknown, we
use a free-form lag structure in our analysis;
that is, we include current and past govern-
ment  expenditures  on  certain  investment
items such as R&D, irrigation, roads, power,
and education in the respective productiv-
ity,  technology,  infrastructure,  and  educa-
tion equations. Then we use statistical tools
to test and determine the appropriate length
of lag for each investment expenditure.
31Alston, Craig, and Pardey (1998) argue that the research lag may be much longer than previously thought or
even infinite. But in many developing countries the national agricultural research systems are much younger than
those in developed countries (often 30 to 50 years old) and their research is of more the applied type. Therefore,
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Various  procedures  have  been  sug-
gested for determining the appropriate lag
length. The adjusted R2 and Akaike’s Infor-
mation  Criteria  (AIC)  are  often  used  by
economists (Greene 1993). This report sim-
ply uses the adjusted R2. Since R2 estimated
from the simultaneous system does not pro-
vide the correct information on the fitness
of the estimation, we use the adjusted R2
stimated from the single equation. The opti-
mal length is determined when adjusted R2
reaches a maximum. The AIC is similar in
spirit to the adjusted R2 in that it rewards
good fit but penalizes the loss of degrees
of  freedom.  The  lags  determined  by  the
adjusted R2 approach are 17, 14, 16, 12, and
17  years  for  R&D,  irrigation,  education,
power, and roads. These are generally very
short in comparison to those in the United
States (Alston, Craig, and Pardey 1998).
Another problem related to the estima-
tion of lag distribution is that independent
variables  (for  example, RDE, RDE–1,
RDE–2, . . . and RDE– i in the productivity
function) are often highly correlated, mak-
ing  the  estimated  coefficients  statistically
insignificant. A number of ways to tackle
this problem have been proposed. The most
popular is to use what are called polynomial
distributed lags, or PDLs. In a polynomial
distributed  lag,  the  coefficients  are  all
required  to  lie  on  a  polynomial  of  some
degree d. This analysis uses PDLs with de-
gree 2. In this case, we only need to esti-
mate three instead of i+1 parameters for the
lag distribution. For more detailed informa-
tion on this subject, refer to Davidson and
MacKinnon  (1993).  Once  the  lengths  of
lags are determined, we estimate the simul-
taneous equation system with the PDLs and
appropriate lag length for each investment.
Estimation Results
Table 5.1 presents the results of the systems
equation  estimation.  Most  of  the  coeffi-
cients in the estimated system are statisti-
cally  significant  at  the  10  percent  confi-
dence level (one-tail test). Since we use the
double-log  functional  form,  the  estimated
coefficients are elasticities in their respec-
tive equations.
The estimated poverty equation (equa-
tion 1) supports the findings of many pre-
vious studies. Improvements in agricultural
productivity, higher agricultural wages, and
increased nonagricultural employment op-
portunities  have  all  contributed  signifi-
cantly to reducing poverty. The coefficient
of  the  terms-of-trade  variable  is  negative
and  statistically  significant,  meaning  that
higher agricultural prices are good for the
poor. This is explained by the fact that most
poor farmers in China are net sellers of agri-
cultural products. When agricultural prices
rise, their incomes rise. This is in sharp con-
trast to India where the poor generally suf-
fer from higher agricultural prices because
they tend to be landless laborers and net
buyers  of  food  grains  (Fan,  Hazell,  and
Thorat 1999). In China, equal distribution
of land-use rights among households guar-
antees equal access to land, the result being
virtually no landless laborers in rural areas.
Although  the  population  growth  vari-
able  is  positively  related  to  poverty,  the
coefficient  is  not  statistically  significant.
Government spending on poverty allevia-
tion loans helps to reduce rural poverty, but
the coefficient of the variable is not statisti-
cally significant.32
The  estimated  agricultural  labor  pro-
ductivity function (equation 2) shows that
agricultural research and extension, roads,
32The authors also tried other specifications of the poverty equation. For example, instead of rural nonfarm
wages and employment, they included labor productivity of the nonfarm sector. The results were similar, how-
ever.  They  prefer  the  current  specification  because  it  permits  modeling  the  separate  effects  of  wages  and
employment on rural poverty reduction.42 CHAPTER 5
irrigation, and education have contributed
significantly to growth in agriculture. But
the coefficient for the electricity variable is
not statistically significant. The coefficient
reported here for agricultural research and
extension is the sum of the past 17 years’
coefficients  from  the  PDLs  distribution.
The significance test is the joint t test of the
three parameters of the PDLs.
The estimates for equation 3 shows that
improved roads, education, and rural tele-
communications have all contributed to the
development  of  the  rural  nonfarm  sector.
Similar  to  the  equation  (2)  estimation,  in
the  agricultural  productivity  function  the
access to electricity variable is not statisti-
cally  significant,  although  the  sign  of  its
coefficient is positive.
Table 5.1 Estimates of the simultaneous equation system
(1) P = –1.13 AGDPPC – 0.560 WAGE – 0.863 NAGEMPLY – 0.064 TT
(–2.76)* (–2.27)* (–3.48)* (–1.82)*
– 0.071 PLOAN + 0.102 APOP–1 R2 = 0.652
(–0.71) (0.88)
(2) AGDPPC = 0.516 LANDPC + 0.104 AKPC + 0.085 RDE + 0.079 ROAD + 0.412 IR
(16.25)* (7.06)* (3.97)* (3.53)* (16.39)*
+ 0.458 SCHY + 0.071 RTR + 0.038 ELECT + 0.123 RAIN R2 = 0.903
(3.58)** (5.26)* (0.79) (4.92)*
(3) NAGDPPC = 0.289 NAKPC + 0.229ROADS + 0.581 SCHY + 0.011 ELECT + 0.179 RTR R2 = 0.812
(6.54)* (4.74)* (3.71)* (0.21) (4.78)*
(4) WAGE = 0.152 ROADS – 0.029 ELECT + 0.107 RTR + 0.667 SCHY
(3.47)* (–0.55) (3.46)* (3.49)*
+ 0.870 AGDPPC-1 – 0.258 APOP + 0.120 UGDP–1 R2 = 0.542
(11.36)* (–1.36) (0.89)
(5) NAGEMPLY = 0.103 ROADS + 0.032 RTR + 1.97 SCHY + 0.420 ELECT
(6.60)* (2.90)* (12.57)* (5.20)*
+ 0.370 AGDPPC–1 + 0.583 UGDP–1 R2 = 0.990
(3.23)* (7.62)*
(6) IR = 0.246 IRE R2 = 0.975
(3.371)*
(7) ROADS = 0.469 ROADE R2 = 0.999
(1.743)*
(8) SCHY = 0.339 EDE R2 = 0.978
(1.755)*
(9) RTR = 0.295 RTRE R2 = 0.982
(2.14)*
(10) ELECT = 0.251 PWRE R2 = 0.988
(5.93)*
(11) TT = –0.192 AGDPPC – 0.043 AGDPPCn R2 = 0.939
(–2.85)* (–1.88)*
Notes: Region and year dummies are not reported. Asterisk indicates that coefficients are statistically significant at the 10 percent level. The
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The estimates for equation 4 show that
rural nonfarm wages are determined mainly
by government investments in roads, edu-
cation, and telecommunications. An impor-
tant finding in this equation is that agricul-
tural  labor  productivity  affects  rural  non-
farm wages significantly. But urban growth
has  no  statistically  significant  impact  on
rural wages.
The estimates for equation 5 show that
improved rural roads, telecommunications,
electrification,  and  education  have  con-
tributed to growth in nonfarm employment.
Growth  in  agricultural  productivity  has
contributed  significantly  to  the  develop-
ment of rural nonfarm employment. In con-
trast to the wage equation, development in
the urban sector had significant impact on
rural nonfarm employment.
The estimated results for equations 6 to
10  show  that  government  investments  in
irrigation, roads, education, rural telecom-
munications, and power have contributed to
the improvement of irrigation, to the devel-
opment of roads, to rural education, to rural
communication, and to the increased use of
electricity. All the coefficients are statisti-
cally significant.
Finally,  the  estimated  terms-of-trade
equation  equation  11  confirms  that  in-
creases  in  agricultural  productivity  at  the
local and national levels exerted a down-
ward pressure on agricultural prices, wors-
ening the terms of trade for agriculture.
The Effects of Public
Investment
Marginal Effects on Growth
and Poverty Reduction
Using equations 1 to 11 and the estimates in
Table 5.1, we can derive the marginal re-
turns to different types of government ex-
penditures in growth and reduction of rural
poverty as shown in equations 12 to 15. We
calculate marginal returns by different types
of investments in three regions.
Table 5.2 presents major development
indicators  of  these  three  regions.  The
coastal region is the most developed with
the best infrastructure and human capital as
well as superior agroclimatic conditions.33
The western region is the least developed
and has poor natural resources and social
infrastructure.  The  central  region  falls  in
between the other two.
Table 5.3 shows the marginal effects of
government  spending  on  agricultural  and
nonagricultural production and rural poverty
for  the  three  regions  and  for  China  as  a
whole. Effects are measured as the returns
in yuan or the number of poor brought out
of poverty per unit of spending in 1997. For
example, the returns to investments in irri-
gation are measured as yuan of additional
production or number of persons brought
out of poverty per one additional unit spent
on irrigation. These measures provide use-
ful information for comparing the relative
benefits of additional units of expenditure
on different items in different regions, par-
ticularly for setting future priorities for gov-
ernment  expenditure  to  further  increase
production and reduce rural poverty.
An important feature of the results in
Table 5.3 is that all production-enhancing
investments  reduce  poverty  while  at  the
same time increasing agricultural and non-
agricultural GDP. However, there are siz-
able  differences  in  production  gains  and
poverty reductions among the various ex-
penditure items and across regions.
For the country as a whole, government
expenditure  on  education  had  by  far  the
33The coastal region includes the following provinces: Hebei, Liaoning, Shandong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian,
Guangdong, and Guangxi. The central region contains Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei,
and Hunan. The remaining provinces are classified as the western region. Tibet is excluded due to the lack of
data. Hainan is included in Guangdong Province. Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin are excluded because of their
small share of rural areas and population.44 CHAPTER 5
largest impact in reducing poverty. In addi-
tion, it had the second largest return to agri-
cultural gross domestic product (AgGDP)
and the third largest return to nonfarm GDP
and overall rural GDP. Therefore, investing
more in education is the dominant “win-win”
strategy. For every 10,000 yuan investment,
some  nine  people  are  brought  out  of
poverty, 30 percent more than comparable
R&D  investments,  which  had  the  second
largest poverty-reduction effect.
Investment in agricultural R&D had the
second  largest  impact  on  poverty,  and  its
impact on AgGDP and overall rural GDP
ranks  first.  Agricultural  R&D  is  thus  an-
other very favorable investment.
Government expenditure on rural infra-
structure also made large contributions to
poverty reduction. These impacts were real-
ized  through  growth  in  both  agricultural
and nonagricultural production. Among the
three  infrastructure  variables  considered,
the impact of roads is particularly large. For
every 10,000 yuan invested, 3.2 poor are
lifted above the poverty line. Roads, thus,
rank third in poverty-reduction impact, after
education and R&D. In terms of impact on
growth, for every yuan invested in roads,
8.83 yuan in rural GDP is produced, only
slightly less than the return to R&D invest-
ments. This stems from high returns to both
agricultural  and  nonagricultural  GDP.
Roads  yielded  the  largest  return  to  rural
nonfarm GDP, at 6.71 yuan for every yuan
invested, 35 percent higher than the return
to  education  investment.  With  respect  to
agricultural GDP, the return to road invest-
ment ranked third, after R&D and educa-
tion investments.
Although electricity investment showed
low  returns  to  both  agricultural  and  non-
agricultural GDP, it ranked fourth in poverty
impact. For every 10,000 yuan investment,
2.3  people  were  brought  out  of  poverty.
This is because access to electricity is es-
sential  to  the  expansion  of  nonfarm  em-
ployment (Table 5.3). For rural telephony,
investments had favorable returns to both
Table 5.2 Social development, productivity, and poverty in rural China among regions,
1985 and 1996
Coastal Central Western
Indicator region region region National
1985
Illiteracy rate (%) 22.5 28.0 35.8 28.0
Years of schooling 4.8 5.1 4.5 5.1
Road density (km/1,000 km2) 221.9 122.9 69.1 111.1
Irrigation (%) 58 36 40 44
Labor productivity (yuan/person) 707.3 718.8 465.3 645.6
Annual rainfall (millimeters) 1,097.6 716.7 506.9 n.a
Number of poor (millions) 10.8 30.4 59.5 100.8
Incidence of poverty (%) 4.5 12.5 35.8 15.5
1996
Illiteracy rate (%) 8.6 11.4 19.8 12.1
Years of schooling 6.9 6.6 6.1 7.0
Road density (km/1,000 km2) 306.2 136.6 81.5 138.3
Irrigation (%) 62 45 46 51
Labor productivity (yuan/person) 1,116.0 990.7 611.9 928.2
Annual rainfall (millimeters) 1,127.3 686.6 506.9 n.a
Number of poor (millions) 5.9 12.7 31.6 50.2
Incidence of poverty (%) 1.9 3.5 14.3 5.6
Sources: SSB various years.
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agricultural and nonagricultural GDP, and
the impact on rural poverty was similar to
that of electricity investments.
For  the  nation  as  a  whole,  irrigation
investment  had  relatively  little  impact  on
rural  poverty  reduction,  although  its  eco-
nomic returns were still positive and higher
than  electricity.  This  is  because  irrigation
affects  poverty  reduction  solely  through
improved agricultural productivity.
One striking result from our study is the
very small and statistically insignificant im-
pact  of  government  poverty  alleviation
loans. In fact, their impact was the smallest
of  all  the  expenditures  considered.  For
every 10,000 yuan invested, only slightly
more  than  one  person  is  brought  out  of
poverty. The effect is only 13 percent of that
for education, 15 percent of that for agricul-
tural  R&D,  50  percent  of  that  for  rural
Table 5.3 Returns of public investments to production and poverty reduction, 1997
Coastal Central Western
Public investment region region region Average
Returns to total rural GDP from investments in
(yuan per yuan expenditure):
R&D 8.60 10.02 12.69 9.59
Irrigation 2.39 1.75 1.56 1.88
Roads 8.38 13.73 4.29 8.83
Education 9.75 7.78 5.06 8.68
Electricity 1.52 1.35 0.61 1.26
Telephone 7.12 8.54 4.13 6.98
Returns to agricultural GDP from investments in
(yuan per yuan expenditure):
R&D 8.60 10.02 12.69 9.59
Irrigation 2.39 1.75 1.56 1.88
Roads 1.67 3.84 1.92 2.12
Education 3.53 3.66 3.28 3.71
Electricity 0.55 0.63 0.40 0.54
Telephone 1.58 2.64 1.99 1.91
Returns to nonfarm GDP from investments in
(yuan per yuan expenditure):
Roads 6.71 9.89 2.37 6.71
Education 6.22 4.13 1.78 4.97
Electricity 0.97 0.71 0.21 0.72
Telephone 5.54 5.91 2.14 5.07
Returns to poverty reduction from investments in
(number of poor reduced per 10,000 yuan expenditure):
R&D 1.99 4.40 33.12 6.79
Irrigation 0.55 0.77 4.06 1.33
Roads 0.83 3.61 10.73 3.22
Education 2.73 5.38 28.66 8.80
Electricity 0.76 1.65 6.17 2.27
Telephone 0.60 1.90 8.51 2.21
Poverty loan 0.88 0.75 1.49 1.13
Notes: The parameters from the productivity functions were used to calculate the returns to GDP (Table 5.1). 
Under the assumption of constant return to scale, coefficients for nonlabor parameters in the production
function should be the same as those in the labor productivity function. The marginal returns can be easily
derived and calculated by multiplying production elasticities by partial productivity of each spending
item. Since only two coefficients (on electricity) are not statistically significant, the results are little dif-
ferent when one uses the only statistically significant coefficients in the calculation.infrastructure, and is even smaller than that
for irrigation.
Regional variation is large in the mar-
ginal  returns  to  government  spending  in
both  GDP  growth  and  poverty  reduction.
In  terms  of  poverty-reduction  effects,  all
kinds  of  investments  had  high  returns  in
the western region. For example, for every
10,000 yuan invested in agricultural R&D,
education, roads, telecommunications, and
electricity, the respective number of poor
reduced were 33, 29, 11, 9, and 6. These
effects are 4.8, 3.3, 3.2, 3.9, and 2.8 times
higher than the national average. Even for
irrigation,  every  10,000  yuan  additional
investment  was  sufficient  to  bring  four
people out of poverty, three times higher
than the national average.
With  respect  to  returns  to  growth  in
agriculture, R&D investment had the high-
est  return  in  the  western  region,  while
irrigation investment had the highest return
in  the  coastal  region.  For  education  and
rural  infrastructure  (roads,  electricity,  and
telecommunications), the central region had
the highest returns. In the coastal region, a
large amount of land has been converted for
nonagricultural use due to rapid industrial-
ization and urbanization. Moreover, incen-
tives to intensify farming are lower there
because  of  more  nonfarm  employment
opportunities. In contrast, land in the west-
ern  region  is  more  marginal  with  limited
water  and  soil  of  low  quality.  Therefore,
major growth potential for agricultural pro-
duction  lies  in  the  central  region,  where
land  is  relatively  less  scarce  and  agricul-
tural production is still the main source of
farmers’ income.
Not surprisingly, most government ex-
penditures had their largest impact on rural
nonfarm GDP in the coastal and central areas.
Contributions to Regional
Inequality
Given the estimated coefficients for equa-
tions (2) and (3), we are in position to apply
the inequality decomposition method out-
lined in equations (17) and (18). Table 5.4
reports  the  contributions  of  each  factor
to  agricultural,  nonagricultural,  and  total
labor  productivities,  respectively,  for  se-
lected years.
It is clear from Table 5.4 that regional
inequality in agricultural labor productivity
has not changed much. But the contribu-
tions  of  various  inputs  to  the  inequality
have  changed  dramatically.  The  contribu-
tions of three conventional inputs (capital,
labor, and land) declined, while the contri-
butions of most public investments, espe-
cially R&D, electrification, and telephones,
increased. Public investment’s total contri-
bution  increased  from  0.110  to  0.221  in
the study period.
In contrast to agricultural productivity,
regional inequality in nonagricultural labor
productivity  almost  doubled.  Capital  and
labor  contributed  little  to  worsening  in-
equality, with public investment in electric-
ity,  telephones,  and  in  total  the  dominant
factor. Public investment’s contribution to
regional inequality in nonagricultural labor
productivity increased by 118 percent from
0.144 to 0.305 during the period.
In order to evaluate the effects of these
input factors on overall inequality, we sub-
stitute the log variance of agricultural labor
productivity and nonagricultural labor pro-
ductivity into equation (18). Using the esti-
mated  parameters  and  the  decomposition
method, we obtain the contributions of var-
ious input factors to overall inequality. Cap-
ital’s  contribution  to  worsening  regional
inequality increased from 0.085 to 0.220,
although its shares in the inequality of agri-
cultural and nonagricultural labor produc-
tivity changed little. This is probably due to
a structural shift in capital from agricultural
to nonagricultural production in the econ-
omy because rural industry is more capital
intensive than agriculture. For the same rea-
son, land and land-enhancing technologies,
especially irrigation, which are mainly used
in agricultural production, accounted for a
decreasing share of overall inequality. The
contributions  of  roads,  agricultural  R&D,
electricity,  and  telecommunications  in-
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creased significantly. All these results sug-
gest a regionally biased public investment
strategy over the past two decades. As dis-
cussed  earlier,  the  coastal  region  enjoyed
the  most  favorable  investment  from  the
government.
Using  the  estimated  coefficients  in
Table 5.1 and 1995 values for all relevant
variables,  we  are  able  to  calculate  the
marginal effects of different types of pub-
lic  investments  on  regional  inequality.
Table 5.5 reports the percentage change in
regional inequality in agricultural, nonagri-
cultural, and total rural labor productivity,
as a result of an additional 100 yuan (about
$12) public investment per rural resident in
each of the three regions. A positive num-
ber in Table 5.5 implies that increasing pub-
lic  investment  in  that  region  will  widen
regional inequality. If the figure is negative,
then public investment in that region will
lead to reduced regional inequality.
The results show large regional vari-
ations  in  the  impact  of  different  public
investments on regional inequality. Addi-
tional investments of all types in the west-
ern  region  reduce  regional  inequality,
whereas  additional  investments  of  all
types  in  the  coastal  and  central  regions
worsen  regional  inequality.  In  particular,
more  investments  in  the  coastal  region
lead to a much greater regional inequality
among the three regions.
Education  has  the  largest  impact,  and
again additional investment in the western
region reduces regional inequality the most,
whereas additional investment in education
in the central and coastal regions worsens
regional inequality. These results are true for
agricultural, nonagricultural, and total GDP.
Additional investments in agricultural R&D
and rural telephones also have large impacts
on regional inequality, following much the
same pattern as investments in education.
Table 5.4 Contributions of input factors to regional inequality, 1978–95
Tele- Public
Year Inequality Capital Labor Land Education Irrigation Roads R&D Electricity phones investment
Agricultural labor
productivity
1978 0.681 0.053 0.370 0.371 0.049 0.069 0.008 –0.012 0.002 –0.007 0.110
1985 0.661 0.052 0.364 0.344 0.028 0.097 0.008 –0.012 0.001 0.004 0.127
1990 0.666 0.045 0.358 0.348 0.043 0.091 0.007 –0.004 0.006 0.003 0.147
1995 0.727 0.049 0.322 0.319 0.038 0.087 0.008 0.012 0.064 0.013 0.221
Nonagricultural labor
productivity
1978 1.320 0.358 0.600 0.063 0.054 0.006 0.020 0.144
1980 1.480 0.353 0.605 0.045 0.044 0.018 0.032 0.140
1985 1.556 0.381 0.563 0.033 0.048 0.039 0.038 0.158
1990 1.786 0.389 0.517 0.041 0.047 0.036 0.076 0.200
1995 2.639 0.365 0.427 0.030 0.044 0.052 0.178 0.305
Total labor
productivity
1978 0.751 0.085 0.389 0.276 0.042 0.082 0.013 –0.010 –0.010 0.004 0.121
1980 0.791 0.090 0.390 0.262 0.026 0.085 0.013 –0.007 –0.007 0.006 0.116
1985 0.779 0.131 0.403 0.248 0.029 0.076 0.017 –0.008 0.010 0.006 0.131
1990 0.873 0.163 0.405 0.211 0.045 0.057 0.021 –0.002 0.013 0.024 0.158
1995 1.510 0.221 0.380 0.105 0.036 0.032 0.028 0.004 0.027 0.116 0.243
Note: The last column is the summation of columns for education, irrigation, roads, R&D, electricity, and telephones.48 CHAPTER 5
Table 5.5 Marginal impact of public investments on regional inequality, 1997
% change in regional inequality resulting from
additional 100-yuan investment per capita
Coastal Central Western
Public investment region region region
Agricultural labor productivity
Roads 0.04 0.05 –0.06
Education 2.15 2.97 –9.15
Phone 2.16 0.86 –0.86
Electricity 0.27 0.35 –0.70
Irrigation 0.73 0.66 –1.29
Agricultural R&D 11.00 9.35 –4.94
Nonagricultural labor productivity
Roads 1.29 0.17 –1.75
Education 13.96 2.20 –39.46
Electricity 2.78 0.40 –5.06
Telephones 23.01 1.04 –6.19
Total rural labor productivity
Roads 0.43 0.41 –0.82
Education 6.23 6.90 –24.72
Telephones 9.03 2.88 –3.41
Electricity 1.09 1.13 –2.79
Irrigation 0.64 0.46 –1.06
Agricultural R&D 6.25 3.72 –7.40
Note: One hundred yuan equals about US$12. Calculations are based on the most recent year for which data are
available, except for telephones, which are based from 1988 to 1993.CHAPTER 6
Conclusions
T
his chapter concludes our study by reporting major findings. It then highlights impli-
cations for future government investment priorities, points out future research direc-
tions, and draws lessons for other developing countries.
Major Findings
Using provincial-level data for 1970–97, this study developed a simultaneous equations model
to  estimate  the  effects  of  different  types  of  government  expenditure  on  growth,  regional
inequality, and rural poverty in China. The results show that government spending on pro-
duction-enhancing investments, such as agricultural research and development (R&D) and
irrigation, rural education, and infrastructure (including roads, electricity, and telecommuni-
cations) all contributed to agricultural productivity growth and reduced regional inequality and
rural poverty. But variations in their marginal effects on productivity were large, among the
different types of spending as well as across regions.
Government expenditure on education had the largest impact on poverty reduction and
very high returns to growth in agriculture and the nonfarm sector, as well as to the rural econ-
omy as a whole. Among all types of investments, additional spending on education in the less-
developed areas (the western region) also had the largest role in reducing regional inequality.
Government spending on agricultural research and extension improved agricultural pro-
duction substantially. In fact, this type of expenditure had the largest returns to growth in agri-
cultural production and overall in the rural economy. Since China is a large country, growth in
agriculture is still much needed to meet the increasing food needs of its richer and larger pop-
ulation. Agricultural growth also trickled down in large benefits for the rural poor. The impact
of R&D on poverty ranked second only to education investments.
Government spending on rural telecommunications, electricity, and roads also had substan-
tial marginal impact on rural poverty reduction. These poverty-reduction effects came mainly
from improved nonfarm employment and increased rural wages. Specifically, road investment
had the largest return to gross domestic product (GDP) growth in the nonfarm economy and the
second largest return to the overall rural economy, only slightly lower than R&D investment.
Irrigation investment had only modest impact on growth in agricultural production and
even less impact on rural poverty reduction, even after trickle-down benefits were allowed
for. This is consistent with the results of Fan, Hazell, and Thorat (1999) for India. Another
striking result is that government spending on loans specifically targeted for poverty allevi-
ation had the least impact on rural poverty reduction. Neither did this type of spending
have any obvious productivity effect. Again this is consistent with the Indian findings of
Fan, Hazell, and Thorat.
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region contribute most to reducing poverty
and regional inequality, because this is where
most of the poor are now concentrated. The
poverty-reduction  effect  of  spending  in
education, agricultural R&D, and roads is
especially  high  in  the  region.  However,
economic returns to most investments are
larger in the central region. Fortunately the
trade-off between poverty reduction in the
western region and production increases in
the central region is rather small.
Priorities of Future
Government Investment
The results of this study have important pol-
icy implications for future priorities in  gov-
ernment expenditure. As Table 3.1 showed,
rural  education  spending  accounted  for
41  percent  of  total  expenditures  in  rural
areas in 1997. Irrigation is next, accounting
for 23 percent. The irrigation spending con-
sidered in this study was only that directly
related  to  irrigation,  not  including  urban
water supply, navigation, and hydropower
generation.  If  the  latter  is  included,  the
spending easily doubles. Investment in rural
infrastructure took about 33 percent of total
government  spending  in  rural  areas,  with
14 percent for rural power, 10 percent for
rural roads, and 9 percent for rural telecom-
munications. Agricultural research accounted
for only a small fraction of total government
investment in rural areas, at 2.2 percent.
Are these allocations optimal for maxi-
mized  growth  and  poverty  reduction  and
balanced regional development? This study
reveals large differential impacts of various
types of government spending on growth,
poverty reduction, and regional inequality.
Potential  gains  from  reallocating  govern-
ment resources are enormous. Based on the
results of our study, we offer the following
policy suggestions:
1. The  government  should  continue
efforts  to  increase  its  overall  investment
in rural areas. Rural investment accounted
for  only  19  percent  of  total  government
expenditures  in  1997,  but  rural  residents
account for 69 percent of China’s total pop-
ulation.  Moreover,  almost  50  percent  of
national  GDP  was  produced  by  the  rural
sector (agriculture and rural township and
village enterprises) in 1997. Government’s
rural spending as a percentage of rural GDP
is  only  about  5  percent  compared  with
11.6 percent for the whole economy. China
has implemented an urban- and industry-
biased investment policy for the past sev-
eral  decades.  As  a  result,  the  rural-urban
income gap is gigantic and has increased
over  time.  Any  policies  against  the  rural
sector will aggravate the existing disparity
and should be discontinued.
2. There is an urgent need to increase
investment  in  agricultural  R&D.  Agricul-
tural research expenditure as percentage of
agricultural gross domestic product AgGDP
is only 0.3 percent. This is extremely low in
comparison to the 2 percent spent in many
developed countries; it is even lower than in
most  developing  countries  (0.5  percent).
Various  evidence,  including  this  study,
shows that agricultural research investment
not  only  has  high  economic  returns  (Fan
2000),  but  it  also  has  a  large  impact  in
reducing rural poverty and regional inequal-
ity. Moreover, new evidence has revealed
that  agricultural  research  contributes  to  a
large drop in urban poverty through low-
ered  food  prices  (Fan,  Fang,  and  Zhang
2001). Without agricultural research, China
would have many more urban poor today.
Finally,  increased  agricultural  research
investment is one of the most efficient ways
to  solve  China’s  long-term  food-security
problem  (Huang,  Rosegrant,  and  Rozelle
1999). All this suggests that increased in-
vestment in agricultural research is a “win-
win-win” (growth, poverty and equity, food
security) national development strategy.
3. The government should gear up its
investment in rural education, even though
its current rural education spending is al-
ready the largest of all rural expenditures.
Improved education helps farmers gain ac-
cess to and use new technologies generated
50 CHAPTER 6by the research system, thereby promoting
agricultural growth. But more importantly,
education  helps  farmers  to  gain  and  im-
prove the skills they need for nonfarm jobs
in rural enterprises and for migration to the
urban sector. Our results show that rural ed-
ucation investment has the largest poverty-
reduction effect per unit of spending. There-
fore, continued increases in rural education
investment, particularly in the less-developed
western region, are a very effective means
of promoting growth in agriculture and rural
nonfarm  employment  and  reducing  rural
poverty and regional inequality.
4. Rural  infrastructure  should  receive
high  priority  in  government’s  investment
portfolio. Like rural education, investments
in infrastructure contribute to reduce rural
poverty and regional inequality mainly by
spurring nonfarm employment and growth
in agricultural production. Among all rural
infrastructures, roads should receive special
attention, as they have the largest poverty-
reduction  and  growth  impact  (compared
with telecommunications and electricity).
5. China invested heavily in irrigation
in the past. Large-scale irrigation facilities
were  built,  and  a  high  percentage  of  the
country’s  arable  land  is  now  under  irri-
gation. The marginal returns from further
investment  may  therefore  be  small  and
declining,  and  future  investments  should
be  geared  to  improving  the  efficiency  of
existing public irrigation systems.
6. The low returns of rural poverty alle-
viation loans to poverty reduction indicate
that these loans should be better targeted.
Studies show that a large part of the funds
have gone to the nonpoor regions and to
nonpoor households, and many rural poor
do not benefit from them at all. The funds
are  also  often  used  for  purposes  such  as
covering administrative costs of local gov-
ernments instead of for poverty alleviation.
Although government has realized the seri-
ousness  of  the  problem,  more  efforts  are
needed to better target the funds to the poor,
or  otherwise  use  the  moneys  to  improve
rural  education  and  infrastructure,  which
promote long-term growth and thereby offer
a long-term solution to poverty reduction.
7. The highest returns in the western re-
gion to all kinds of investment in reducing
both rural poverty and regional inequality,
as  evidenced  in  this  study,  are  consistent
with  the  national  strategy  to  develop  the
western region. In particular, investment in
agricultural  research,  education,  and  rural
infrastructure there should be the govern-
ment’s  top  priority.  Considering  China’s
decentralized fiscal system and the western
region’s small tax base, fiscal transfers from
the richer coastal region are called for to
develop the vast west.
Future Research Directions
A number of issues deserve more attention
in future research. First, China is on the
brink of joining the World Trade Organi-
zation (WTO). It is unclear how the gov-
ernment can use public investment as an
instrument to alleviate any negative effects
of  WTO  membership  on  national  food
security and the welfare of the rural pop-
ulation.  In  particular,  the  poor  in  less-
developed areas such as the Northwest and
Southwest  will  suffer  disproportionately,
because they are most sensitive to changes
in agricultural prices.
Second, a general-equilibrium analysis
is  needed  to  analyze  how  government
investment in rural areas affects not only
the agricultural sector and rural areas, but
also other sectors and cities. Studies that
ignore  these  impacts  severely  under-
estimate  the  overall  impact  of  public
investment on poverty.
Finally, an analysis of the political and
institutional context of public investments
and  conditions  for  efficient  provision  of
public  goods  and  services  is  also  much
needed to improve the efficiency of public
investments. In particular, how the govern-
ment  can  design  a  mechanism  (policies,
regulations,  fiscal  systems)  to  mobilize
public resources to invest in rural areas de-
serves more research attention in the future.
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How to reform public institutions by im-
proving  the  incentive  system,  account-
ability,  human  capital,  and  management
is also an important research issue.
Implications for Other
Developing Countries
The results of this study provide important
insights for other developing countries that
are  redesigning  their  spending  policy  to
achieve development goals. Many devel-
oping  countries  are  undergoing  substan-
tial macroeconomic adjustments. It is un-
clear  whether  such  programs  will  affect
government  expenditures,  and  therefore
growth in agricultural production and re-
ductions in poverty.
Various empirical studies confirm the
important role of government spending in
spurring long-term growth in the national
economy  (Tanzi  and  Zee  1997;  Barro
1990) and in agriculture (Elias 1985; Fan,
Hazell, and Thorat 1999; Fan and Pardey
1997). But equally important to discern is
that different types of spending (for exam-
ple, by sector and by region) may have dif-
ferent impacts on growth, as shown in this
report. Moreover, different types of spend-
ing may have different implications for the
distribution of economic gains. Most im-
portantly,  differing  types  of  government
spending  may  result  in  different  conse-
quences  for  the  poor.  Ways  to  alleviate
poverty  are  being  increasingly  debated
among  academicians  and  policymakers.
Less known is how recent changes in the
level and composition of government ex-
penditures  have  affected  growth  and
poverty reduction in developing countries.
Since  significant  increases  in  public
rural investment seem unlikely, countries
will have to give greater emphasis to using
their  public  investment  resources  more
efficiently. This requires better targeting of 
investment to achieve growth and poverty
alleviation goals and improved efficiency
within  the  agencies  that  provide  public
goods and services. Reliable information
on  the  marginal  effects  of  various  types
of  government  spending  is  crucial  for
government  to  make  sound  investment
decisions. Without such information, it is
difficult  for  governments  to  hone  future
investment  priorities  to  achieve  national
development goals. There is therefore an
urgent need to conduct studies similar to
this one in other developing countries.APPENDIX A
Major Milestones in Reforming
Chinese Agriculture
1950–52 Land reform: Land owned by landlords was confiscated and redistributed to land-
less or small-scale farmers. By 1952, the land reform was complete.
1953–57 Cooperatization: After 1952, mutual aid farming groups were formed on a volun-
tary basis. Land was still owned by individual households. From 1955 on, more
advanced cooperatives were formed at the strong suggestion of the government.
Land and other production inputs were owned by cooperatives. By 1957, 90 per-
cent of households participated in these cooperatives.
1958–60 Great Leap Forward and communization: Communes were formed based on ad-
vanced cooperatives. The size of communes was large and the distribution of food
was based on need rather than any economic mechanism.
1961–65 Economic adjustments: Adjustments and consolidation policy were implemented
in 1962 after the failure of the commune system. Agricultural production was de-
centralized into small units (the production teams).
1966–76 Cultural Revolution: Three levels of ownership—commune, brigade, and produc-
tion team—were implemented with the production team as their basis. Private
ownership of land and marketing of agricultural products were severely restricted
outside the government procurement system.
1979–84 First phase reforms: In 1979, procurement prices for 18 commodities were raised
(50 percent increase for above-quota sales). The household production responsibil-
ity system was introduced and by 1984 more than 96 percent of households oper-
ated under the system. The number of commodities under state monopoly procure-
ment control was reduced from 100 to 51 in 1993, and to 38 by the end of 1984.
1985–89 Second phase reforms: The monopoly procurement system was changed from
mandatory to a voluntary contract system. Above-quota prices were reduced.
1990s New stage: The urban grain rationing system was abolished in 1993. Land contract
between farmers and collectives was extended for another 30 years. Procurement
prices for grains were increased by 40 percent in 1994 and again by 42 percent in
1996. In 1997, the government regained a certain amount of control over the grain
marketing system.
Sources: Compiled by the authors from various government documents.
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Chronology of Poverty Alleviation Policies
September 29, 1984 The  Communist  Party  of  China  (CPC)  Central  Committee  and  State  Council
jointly issued a circular calling on party committees and governments at all levels
to adopt practical measures to help people in impoverished areas eliminate poverty
at the earliest possible date.
April 1986 Poverty relief work was included in the Seventh Five-Year Plan for National
Economic and Social Development. The State Council established a Leading
Group for Economic Development of Impoverished Areas. The State Science
and Technology Commission, State Nationalities Affairs Commission, and the
Ministry of Agriculture launched their respective poverty-relief programs geared
to selected areas.
October 30, 1987 The State Council announced the Circular on Promoting Economic Development
in Poor Areas. It demanded the efficiency of funds for development be raised to
realize the Seventh Five-Year Plan objectives for solving problems of food and
clothing among the majority of population in poor areas.
May 1991 The State Council approved the Report on the Work of Poverty Alleviation and
Development in the Eighth Five-Year Plan by the Leading Group for Economic
Development of Impoverished Areas. It stipulated that efforts should focus on
promoting farmland capital construction and raising grain output so as to enable
rural households to have a stable source of income for adequate food and clothing.
September 1993 The State Council approves the National Poverty-Relief Program, which aims to
ensure adequate food and clothing for the existing 80 million poor within seven
years (from 1994 to 2000). At the same time, the Leading Group for Economic
Development of Impoverished Areas is renamed the State Council Leading Group
Office of Poverty Alleviation and Development.
March 6, 1995 At the UN World Summit on Social Development held in Denmark, Premier Li
Peng announces that China will eliminate abject poverty in rural areas by the
end of this century.
September 23, 1996 General Secretary Jiang Zemin delivers an important speech at the CPC Central
Committee’s  meeting  on  poverty-relief  work.  He  urges  no  effort  be  spared  to
realize the goals of the National Poverty-Relief Program as planned.
May 6, 1997 At the 25th meeting of the National People’s Congress (NPC) Standing Commit-
tee, State Councilor Chen Junsheng suggests that poverty-relief work be listed on
the agenda of legislation to guarantee the continuity and stability of the work and
that a national law on poverty relief be formulated.
Sources: Compiled from official Chinese documents.
54APPENDIX C
Provincial Data on Rural Public Spending
S
ub-national-level data on public spending by various investment items are not easily
available for most developing countries. China is no exception in this, although these
data have become more accessible. Most such data are published in Chinese and must
be compiled from different sources. Moreover, the definitions, scope, and coverage of the
variables may vary over time and across regions (explained in detail in Chapter 5). For these
reasons, this appendix includes some of the recently released provincial data used in the
authors’ analysis, which might be of more general interest.
All spending data were deflated into 1990 prices using the GDP deflator unless specified
otherwise. Income data was deflated into 1990 prices using the consumer price index, while
agricultural output values and agricultural and nonagricultural GDP were measured in 1990
constant prices.
China has also experienced boundary changes over the last two decades. Hainan province
was created in 1987, having been part of Guangdong province prior to that. This analysis still
includes  Hainan  as  part  of  Guangdong.  Chongqing  was  created  in  1997  out  of  Sichuan
province. For the 1997 data, Chongqing was thus aggregated into Sichuan province.
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Table C.1 Annual growth of production, inputs, and productivity, 1979–97 (%)
Total factor
Province Production Inputs Productivity
Anhui 5.00 1.67 3.34
Fujian 5.60 0.83 4.59
Gansu 4.77 2.09 2.79
Guangdong 5.95 –0.07 5.68
Guangxi 7.87 1.65 6.02
Guizhou 4.12 2.49 1.88
Hebei 5.23 1.42 3.76
Heilongjiang 4.60 1.24 3.33
Henan 4.88 1.90 3.05
Hubei 4.33 0.78 3.45
Hunan 3.49 0.70 2.72
Inner Mongolia 7.27 2.18 5.03
Jiangsu 4.41 0.28 3.94
Jiangxi 4.79 1.19 3.54
Jilin 3.54 1.82 1.87
Liaoning 4.49 0.33 3.97
Ningxia 6.84 2.46 4.40
Qinghai 2.61 0.99 1.67
Shaanxi 3.94 1.67 2.36
Shandong 4.75 0.78 3.84
Shanxi 3.32 0.87 2.43
Sichuan 3.44 0.82 2.57
Xinjiang 6.66 1.60 4.94
Yunan 5.59 2.16 3.49
Zhejiang 3.18 –0.46 3.37
National 4.57 1.25 3.28
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Table C.2 Agricultural research expenditures, 1990–97 (millions of 1990 yuan)
Annual
growth
Province 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 rate (%)
Beijing 71.02 28.87 28.88 48.11 41.82 44.12 42.16 47.05 –5.71
Tianjin 12.51 12.45 15.89 15.61 15.30 20.61 22.10 23.16 9.19
Hebei 29.78 28.25 33.70 34.66 38.37 45.61 42.63 42.23 5.11
Shanxi 26.93 33.15 38.19 38.64 38.41 39.79 43.21 46.99 8.28
Inner Mongolia 18.81 19.21 21.91 20.80 19.52 17.78 17.96 22.91 2.86
Liaoning 72.00 82.45 95.99 87.66 89.24 86.09 84.30 87.55 2.83
Jilin 63.71 62.27 78.43 69.08 48.03 65.92 126.82 123.13 9.87
Helongjian 48.11 55.32 70.80 72.58 59.23 59.42 52.21 48.21 0.03
Shanghai 19.75 26.36 26.23 35.99 34.79 38.35 37.44 33.38 7.79
Jiangsu 53.19 78.72 74.28 73.87 98.14 84.17 107.36 115.62 11.73
Zhejiang 33.18 37.46 48.10 50.55 46.32 53.90 45.27 57.40 8.14
Anhui 12.90 13.18 14.55 17.82 22.35 23.74 34.52 28.78 12.15
Fujian 30.75 27.88 29.71 24.40 29.40 34.15 33.08 42.86 4.86
Jiangxi 51.64 64.41 92.11 102.09 119.35 118.01 86.59 74.42 5.36
Shandong 46.29 53.98 66.52 71.09 58.10 53.87 70.36 83.93 8.87
Henan 27.50 30.88 29.35 34.09 43.65 43.30 69.96 61.53 12.19
Hubei 46.69 46.22 51.75 53.91 58.36 54.95 60.98 61.07 3.91
Hunan 49.70 54.38 67.91 77.04 63.11 57.76 55.71 60.18 2.77
Guangdong 105.84 199.62 230.64 248.22 307.94 258.25 274.79 278.32 14.81
Guangxi 35.68 40.34 44.16 52.25 57.12 52.50 53.59 50.62 5.13
Sichuan 56.82 69.86 121.62 126.96 157.17 122.58 109.43 117.52 10.94
Guizhou 17.69 17.96 20.77 21.92 22.86 22.36 24.67 56.36 18.00
Yunnan 39.60 46.50 63.88 74.88 66.19 61.94 65.78 56.36 5.17
Tibet 5.20 7.67 6.43 5.82 5.85 6.94 8.39 7.54 5.45
Shaanxi 26.55 17.99 23.39 55.17 20.05 26.76 19.00 20.93 –3.34
Gansu 22.76 23.91 23.28 21.32 18.93 17.79 21.95 20.53 –1.46
Qinghai 8.71 8.47 9.07 7.54 6.86 6.36 7.84 8.27 –0.74
Ningxia 12.27 20.07 16.36 18.07 17.49 18.00 15.72 16.99 4.75
Xinjiang 33.74 37.72 46.81 37.64 38.25 40.10 47.61 110.01 18.39
Source: Ministry of Agriculture 1990–97.58 APPENDIX C
Table C.3 Rural education expenditures, 1990–97 (millions of 1990 yuan)
Annual
growth
Province 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 rate (%)
Beijing 96 99 98 89 73 66 64 64 –5.61
Tianjin 189 198 210 252 219 208 222 236 3.23
Hebei 1,339 1,343 1,522 2,038 1,909 1,919 2,227 2,458 9.06
Shanxi 804 828 928 1,144 1,039 1,019 1,341 1,318 7.32
Inner Mongolia 529 487 538 574 526 520 654 662 3.25
Liaoning 961 1,016 1,093 1,190 1,052 1,010 1,012 1,084 1.74
Jilin 592 619 671 866 769 742 732 758 3.59
Helongjian 588 608 657 861 768 743 845 959 7.23
Shanghai 340 368 414 522 488 490 564 630 9.22
Jiangsu 1,791 1,843 2,081 2,395 2,032 1,883 2,066 2,289 3.57
Zhejiang 1,448 1,522 1,681 908 795 757 874 1,012 –4.98
Anhui 750 791 898 1,355 1,428 1,553 1,773 1,923 14.40
Fujian 1,193 1,265 1,404 1,314 1,241 1,254 1,326 1,490 3.22
Jiangxi 693 704 849 979 862 825 982 1,055 6.18
Shandong 2,245 2,405 2,744 3,318 3,119 3,142 3,459 3,429 6.23
Henan 1,767 1,845 2,173 2,386 2,241 2,256 3,124 3,060 8.16
Hubei 1,212 1,265 1,441 1,743 1,626 1,630 1,756 1,950 7.03
Hunan 1,763 1,840 2,020 2,186 2,098 2,146 2,358 2,438 4.74
Guangdong 3,305 3,555 4,193 4,572 4,339 4,402 5,481 4,233 3.60
Guangxi 1,294 1,361 1,506 1,811 1,637 1,600 1,764 1,779 4.66
Sichuan 1,689 1,680 1,876 2,649 2,337 2,238 2,459 2,641 6.59
Guizhou 455 457 533 661 587 566 588 664 5.55
Yunnan 1,060 1,122 1,284 1,572 1,360 1,282 1,629 1,851 8.28
Tibet 82 82 82 74 67 66 61 158 9.82
Shaanxi 689 733 788 903 823 810 990 930 4.37
Gansu 453 447 502 620 544 519 591 676 5.90
Qinghai 89 90 99 126 105 96 122 132 5.81
Ningxia 120 117 126 148 127 118 139 161 4.26
Xinjiang 383 397 436 620 574 572 630 663 8.14
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Table C.4 Irrigation and water conservancy investments, 1990–97
(millions of 1990 yuan)
Annual
growth
Province 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 rate (%)
Beijing 189 91 139 356 260 230 102 271 5.28
Tianjin 44 75 64 108 82 110 136 119 15.23
Hebei 110 102 162 204 228 297 1,204 473 23.15
Shanxi 108 136 223 297 413 396 128 699 30.57
Inner Mongolia 111 132 154 154 110 86 50 473 22.99
Liaoning 270 286 444 555 407 503 141 285 0.78
Jilin 105 119 153 168 165 186 34 223 11.38
Helongjian 157 188 269 269 373 303 106 277 8.43
Shanghai 136 207 293 359 383 204 174 151 1.50
Jiangsu 161 254 345 371 469 583 372 890 27.67
Zhejiang 101 168 265 265 359 412 695 976 38.28
Anhui 214 284 431 321 204 268 365 314 5.61
Fujian 113 153 263 402 441 471 208 573 26.10
Jiangxi 143 185 235 233 275 234 104 227 6.84
Shandong 214 258 525 489 564 504 731 726 19.06
Henan 498 569 868 1,146 1,325 2,120 2,684 2,764 27.74
Hubei 344 366 657 374 539 507 365 530 6.38
Hunan 156 197 385 552 551 690 439 801 26.32
Guangdong 438 824 995 960 1,147 716 1,207 1,770 22.08
Guangxi 72 152 220 245 310 320 98 399 27.71
Sichuan 264 523 655 865 894 1,004 296 968 20.39
Guizhou 127 128 139 152 155 163 60 198 6.54
Yunnan 149 159 198 268 293 382 296 500 18.88
Tibet 4 0 0 12 19 88 25 155 68.57
Shaanxi 94 109 144 155 150 187 127 554 28.83
Gansu 56 297 330 352 303 296 238 423 33.48
Qinghai 72 45 75 52 59 69 72 146 10.63
Ningxia 56 55 62 40 37 36 71 23 –11.70
Xinjiang 65 179 189 191 229 181 462 602 37.45
Source: Ministry of Water Conservancy 1980.60 APPENDIX C
Table C.5 Illiteracy rates of rural laborers, 1988, 1990, and 1997 (%)
Annual
growth
Province 1988 1990 1997 rate (%)
Beijing 8.63 5.10 1.81 –15.93
Tianjin 8.81 6.80 2.85 –11.79
Hebei 15.49 12.18 4.59 –12.64
Shanxi 11.59 8.97 5.71 –7.56
Inner Mongolia 20.03 16.93 9.68 –7.76
Liaoning 7.66 5.68 1.86 –14.55
Jilin 11.63 9.24 3.66 –12.05
Helongjian 16.54 12.44 3.89 –14.86
Shanghai 12.58 9.94 5.79 –8.26
Jiangsu 26.79 22.36 7.93 –12.65
Zhejiang 19.57 16.39 9.02 –8.25
Anhui 34.36 28.91 10.47 –12.37
Fujian 29.78 23.42 8.79 –12.68
Jiangxi 24.69 20.11 7.75 –12.08
Shandong 22.61 17.43 6.54 –12.87
Henan 25.48 19.82 8.85 –11.09
Hubei 19.72 16.53 6.65 –11.38
Hunan 14.47 10.82 4.62 –11.91
Guangdong 15.52 12.84 5.94 –10.12
Guangxi 15.79 13.40 7.36 –8.13
Sichuan 26.66 21.12 10.76 –9.59
Guizhou 39.04 34.77 24.47 –5.06
Yunnan 39.95 33.62 21.83 –6.49
Tibet 75.43 73.30 63.86 –1.83
Shaanxi 25.85 21.98 12.48 –7.77
Gansu 42.71 37.89 25.89 –5.41
Qinghai 52.42 47.57 33.76 –4.77
Ningxia 38.19 36.76 25.28 –4.48
Xinjiang 28.87 22.05 12.43 –8.94
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Table C.6 Length of roads, 1990–97 (kilometers)
Annual
growth
Province 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 rate (%)
Beijing 9,648 10,259 10,827 11,260 11,532 11,811 12,084 12,306 3.54
Tianjin 4,007 4,068 4,088 4,117 4,156 4,243 4,264 4,287 0.97
Hebei 43,640 45,464 47,034 49,195 50,496 51,630 54,146 56,009 3.63
Shanxi 30,784 31,040 31,554 32,210 32,693 33,644 35,911 44,043 5.25
Inner Mongolia 43,274 43,396 43,704 43,789 44,202 44,753 45,744 49,992 2.08
Liaoning 40,109 40,195 41,548 41,638 42,763 43,434 43,753 44,041 1.34
Jilin 26,468 27,110 27,193 28,374 29,581 31,321 32,098 33,075 3.23
Helongjian 47,169 47,188 47,882 48,023 48,356 48,819 48,987 49,631 0.73
Shanghai 3,050 3,165 3,625 3,677 3,721 3,787 3,881 3,961 3.80
Jiangsu 24,772 24,929 25,325 25,505 25,891 25,970 26,659 27,102 1.29
Zhejiang 30,195 30,700 31,924 32,838 33,170 34,121 34,924 36,127 2.60
Anhui 30,126 30,448 30,571 30,723 30,876 35,178 36,182 37,481 3.17
Fujian 41,011 41,745 41,882 43,558 44,608 46,574 47,196 47,680 2.18
Jiangxi 33,203 33,222 33,986 34,207 34,556 34,915 34,963 35,234 0.85
Shandong 40,772 4,1937 43,134 46,033 50,225 54,243 57,271 59,260 5.49
Henan 43,150 44,199 45,049 46,487 47,704 49,707 50,907 55,015 3.53
Hubei 47,511 47,661 47,892 48,008 48,349 48,728 49,757 50,779 0.95
Hunan 57,460 57,693 58,110 58,110 58,803 59,125 59,554 59,761 0.56
Guangdong 67,564 68,229 68,820 80,491 88,731 99,375 104,528 107,108 6.80
Guangxi 36,214 36,660 37,291 38,495 39,550 40,904 42,696 45,378 3.28
Sichuan 97,234 98,122 98,920 99,342 100,002 100,724 101,646 103,111 0.84
Guizhou 31,157 31,588 31,889 32,092 32,398 32,487 32,700 33,211 0.92
Yunnan 56,536 58,123 60,045 63,086 65,578 68,236 70,279 73,821 3.88
Tibet 21,842 21,944 21,944 21,944 21,842 22,391 22,391 22,455 0.40
Shaanxi 37,986 38,193 38,318 38,536 39,058 39,620 40,200 41,202 1.17
Gansu 34,708 34,776 34,822 34,875 34,984 35,194 35,338 35,594 0.36
Qinghai 16,732 16,769 16,854 16,963 17,061 17,223 17,383 17,640 0.76
Ningxia 8,200 8,200 8,200 8,301 8,324 8,554 8,738 9,048 1.42
Xinjiang 25,425 25,697 26,024 27,961 28,611 30,298 31,609 32,053 3.36
Sources: China Statistical Yearbook (SSB, various years).
Notes: Length of roads here refers to the total length of roads. The length of rural roads for the selected years
is available in the China Rural Statistical Yearbook (SSB, various years).62 APPENDIX C
Table C.7 Rural telephones, 1990–97 (thousands of sets)
Annual
growth
Province 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 rate (%)
Beijing 18.50 19.10 19.10 20.60 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Tianjin 1.54 1.47 3.90 5.36 23.00 108.70 189.71
Hebei 37.69 43.60 53.25 79.91 191.00 459.00 86.81
Shanxi 16.00 16.00 17.00 20.00 33.30 76.00 47.63
Inner Mongolia 19.00 20.00 21.00 30.00 25.10 30.00 12.10
Liaoning 111.00 122.00 135.50 168.90 190.00 375.00 35.57
Jilin 50.00 56.30 67.80 84.50 116.00 222.00 45.16
Helongjian 35.70 41.30 50.20 67.10 94.00 180.00 49.85
Shanghai 64.30 79.60 103.90 147.10 76.17 145.95 22.74
Jiangsu 266.39 306.75 394.16 569.00 826.00 1,580.00 56.06
Zhejiang 125.80 156.50 222.10 346.90 785.00 1,440.00 83.94
Anhui 50.30 57.20 46.90 64.20 116.00 229.00 46.07
Fujian 41.40 51.10 71.90 131.40 295.00 548.00 90.74
Jiangxi 24.94 27.13 31.35 39.11 57.00 139.00 53.65
Shandong 73.00 81.00 95.00 128.00 363.00 755.00 79.33
Henan 52.40 56.00 63.20 78.10 114.00 209.00 41.32
Hubei 70.70 75.05 81.77 97.74 180.00 396.00 53.84
Hunan 42.00 52.00 72.90 98.10 166.00 321.00 66.27
Guangdong 410.80 544.10 748.50 129.40 2,019.00 2,810.00 61.72
Guangxi 34.98 37.78 42.97 50.41 71.30 121.00 36.38
Sichuan 58.81 65.79 75.35 87.46 118.00 229.00 40.47
Guizhou 16.31 16.66 16.94 17.18 18.90 31.00 17.42
Yunnan 36.83 38.39 41.45 47.34 62.10 112.00 32.05
Tibet 0.31 0.31 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.28 -2.19
Shaanxi 21.18 23.38 27.61 31.67 44.30 100.80 47.69
Gansu 11.47 12.76 14.46 17.73 23.50 36.00 33.11
Qinghai 12.50 11.70 11.60 11.80 2.14 4.60 -22.11
Ningxia 1.83 2.02 2.37 3.05 5.50 14.90 69.01
Xinjiang 10.52 11.12 12.96 17.54 23.20 15.20 9.64
Sources: China Statistical Yearbook (SSB, various years).PROVINCIAL DATA ON RURAL PUBLIC SPENDING 63
Table C.8 Share of irrigated areas in total arable land, 1990–97 (%)
Annual
growth
Province 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 rate (%)
Beijing 80.93 78.86 75.20 77.62 76.85 80.85 80.91 80.12 –0.14
Tianjin 80.06 80.43 80.66 79.19 81.42 83.24 82.52 82.61 0.45
Hebei 57.29 58.62 59.38 60.14 60.73 61.99 65.18 65.26 1.88
Shanxi 30.64 31.16 31.56 32.03 32.46 32.98 33.07 32.83 0.99
Inner Mongolia 25.48 26.43 33.37 33.86 33.03 32.35 33.71 33.75 4.10
Liaoning 30.53 31.48 33.03 34.10 34.71 35.51 36.23 36.39 2.54
Jilin 22.41 23.45 23.27 23.08 23.01 22.88 23.68 24.45 1.26
Helongjian 12.22 12.63 12.99 13.05 11.39 12.17 14.82 18.23 5.88
Shanghai 98.66 99.27 98.93 99.07 99.05 99.21 98.28 98.16 –0.07
Jiangsu 87.04 84.62 85.28 85.07 85.10 86.16 86.28 86.27 –0.13
Zhejiang 85.33 86.08 86.55 87.21 87.31 87.71 87.32 87.28 0.32
Anhui 60.22 62.46 63.88 65.28 66.89 68.37 69.25 69.29 2.03
Fujian 75.41 76.10 76.82 77.51 77.41 77.78 77.67 77.52 0.39
Jiangxi 77.99 78.85 79.39 80.15 78.49 81.43 81.84 81.87 0.70
Shandong 64.99 66.61 67.62 68.41 69.10 69.63 70.07 70.67 1.20
Henan 51.12 53.47 54.88 56.30 57.56 59.42 61.58 61.71 2.73
Hubei 66.66 67.39 68.80 67.18 66.30 64.75 71.01 69.49 0.60
Hunan 80.63 78.93 80.86 81.76 82.22 82.47 82.07 82.26 0.29
Guangdong 65.49 63.72 61.98 60.07 59.49 60.76 60.60 60.68 –1.08
Guangxi 57.81 57.47 57.98 57.43 57.19 56.31 56.26 56.36 –0.36
Sichuan 44.49 45.00 45.45 45.86 46.31 46.83 47.26 47.28 0.87
Guizhou 29.68 27.65 33.39 32.35 32.97 33.27 33.63 33.77 1.86
Yunnan 37.34 37.85 40.25 39.58 41.30 43.54 44.71 45.29 2.79
Tibet n.a n.a n.a n.a 72.94 72.99 65.63 74.11 n.a.
Shaanxi 35.67 36.44 37.37 38.16 38.73 39.49 37.94 37.96 0.89
Gansu 24.57 24.93 25.42 25.85 26.26 25.63 26.96 27.09 1.40
Qinghai 29.99 30.27 30.21 30.39 30.26 30.06 29.85 31.08 0.51
Ningxia 32.74 33.25 37.01 34.24 34.25 34.46 34.86 41.30 3.37
Xinjiang 92.99 91.46 89.43 90.06 89.56 88.87 90.83 91.64 –0.21
Sources: Calculated from the China Rural Statistical Yearbook (SSB, various years).64 APPENDIX C
Table C.9 Rural electricity consumption, 1990–97 (hundreds of millions of kilowatts)
Annual
growth
Province 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 rates (%)
Beijing 18 20 14.4 17 17.2 20.2 20.2 25.1 4.86
Tianjin 16.5 18.1 21.8 23.1 25.1 32.5 35.8 33 10.41
Hebei 58.8 65.5 78.1 85.1 101.8 118.5 150 161.3 15.51
Shanxi 26 30 34 38 41.5 46.1 48.7 54.5 11.15
Inner Mongolia 11 11.7 12.2 13.5 15.5 16.7 16.7 17.7 7.03
Liaoning 47 54.8 63.5 73.7 72.7 81.6 89 96 10.74
Jilin 16.8 18.2 19 19.8 21.5 21.5 22.1 22.6 4.33
Helongjian 17.6 20.3 21 22 23 23.5 24.3 26.1 5.79
Shanghai 32.5 40 40.1 50 54.2 52.3 62.5 65.8 10.60
Jiangsu 105.3 121.5 146.5 169.2 206 238.2 252.2 263.1 13.98
Zhejiang 69.4 84 98 115.4 147 169.2 181 190.1 15.48
Anhui 23.6 26 29.9 27.8 32.2 37.4 36.4 43.1 8.98
Fujian 20.4 23.4 26.9 29.2 36 45.7 50 57.8 16.04
Jiangxi 16 16.8 18.3 22.1 23.5 26.6 29.1 30.8 9.81
Shandong 75.7 84.2 100.2 106.6 132.3 147.3 152.4 169.5 12.20
Henan 46.9 52.1 59.6 61.1 72.6 85.1 103.7 118.3 14.13
Hubei 27.2 27.8 30.9 33.4 40.8 47.4 50.6 55.4 10.70
Hunan 23.4 25.8 27.7 30 33 37.6 38.9 41.7 8.60
Guangdong 57.8 73.9 101.2 128.9 175.6 187.5 205 244 22.84
Guangxi 12.6 15.1 17 19 20.8 23.6 25.2 27.1 11.56
Sichuan 44 48 52.3 59.6 69.7 78.8 82.6 81.1 9.13
Guizhou 6.1 4.7 6.1 5.4 6.7 7.9 7.9 11.1 8.93
Yunnan 12.2 13.9 15.4 16.8 19.4 20.7 25 28.3 12.77
Tibet n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.2 0.18 0.17 n.a.
Shaanxi 29.2 28.6 32.6 36.1 40.8 44.6 45.8 50.5 8.14
Gansu 14.2 19.1 20.4 21.8 22.8 21.4 30.3 25.6 8.78
Qinghai 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.9 2.2 2 2.1 2.1 4.92
Ningxia 3.9 4.5 4.9 4.8 5.4 5.6 6.5 7.3 9.37
Xinjiang 10.5 12 13.1 13.8 14.4 16.2 17.8 20.8 10.26
Sources: China Rural Statistical Yearbook (SSB, various years).
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Table C.10 Share of nonfarm employment in total rural employment, 1980–97 (%)
Province 1980 1985 1990 1995 1997
Beijing 13.08 52.58 55.24 59.88 59.49
Tianjin 11.97 46.49 47.60 52.38 54.10
Hebei 7.65 20.43 24.58 33.34 38.00
Shanxi 8.14 29.37 29.61 33.35 34.34
Inner Mongolia 6.48 8.46 11.25 14.66 15.41
Liaoning 13.64 28.16 27.14 31.54 32.25
Jilin 9.05 11.18 11.91 14.85 15.35
Helongjian 9.97 13.03 13.81 17.70 15.86
Shanghai 19.06 58.66 70.00 71.53 70.03
Jiangsu 13.77 34.44 38.48 44.42 44.28
Zhejiang 8.09 32.30 34.32 45.36 47.29
Anhui 2.98 12.53 16.44 25.53 26.54
Fujian 6.05 19.83 23.76 32.35 34.70
Jiangxi 4.50 16.27 17.32 28.51 29.73
Shandong 7.03 21.42 25.10 29.96 30.41
Henan 5.59 12.76 17.64 25.58 27.71
Hubei 7.12 19.67 18.83 26.59 29.02
Hunan 5.61 15.32 13.12 23.27 25.25
Guangdong 5.71 23.56 30.95 44.68 36.41
Guangxi 2.68 6.05 10.11 20.44 21.77
Sichuan 3.93 10.56 13.41 23.14 27.12
Guizhou 1.89 5.99 8.33 14.16 16.01
Yunnan 2.79 8.64 8.76 11.06 12.23
Tibet 2.08 4.67 5.29 5.96 6.95
Shaanxi 5.90 15.52 16.78 20.80 22.08
Gansu 2.86 20.19 16.78 23.80 24.47
Qinghai 2.03 10.90 11.92 13.69 14.37
Ningxia 4.63 9.88 11.66 15.45 17.67
Xinjiang 4.09 7.01 7.59 9.25 9.58
Source: China Rural Statistical Yearbook (SSB,various years).66 APPENDIX C
Table C.11 Rural poverty incidence, 1985–96 (%)
Province 1985 1986 1987 1991 1996
Beijing 0 0 0 0.1 0.8
Tianjin 0 0 0 0.3 0.3
Hebei 4.9 11.2 5.8 13.4 3.9
Shanxi 4.1 6.8 10 17 7.5
Inner Mongolia 10.6 38 1.3 13.7 9.3
Liaoning 6.5 6 0 4.4 2.9
Jilin 0 0 0 8.7 4.7
Helongjian 14.1 1.3 1.3 14.3 6.7
Shanghai 0 0 0 0.1 0.1
Jiangsu 0 0 0 4.1 0.1
Zhejiang 4.5 2.3 0 3.6 0.1
Anhui 5.1 2 0.8 27.8 2.7
Fujian 6.3 5.2 0 1.4 0.5
Jiangxi 12.1 6 27.9 0.3 0.7
Shandong 2.3 0 0 4.1 1.9
Henan 24.9 28.7 16.7 21.7 4.3
Hubei 3.7 5.4 2.5 9 2.7
Hunan 12.6 9.4 1.4 3.1 1.5
Guangdong 0 1 0 0.3 0.2
Guangxi 22.2 19.7 11.7 7 6.4
Sichuan 35.1 21.6 15.5 11.2 7
Guizhou 36.8 38.3 32.7 23.5 12.8
Yunnan 41.3 42.4 36 17.3 22.9
Tibet n.a. n.a. 3.8 11.6 10.1
Shaanxi 41.6 31.5 16.7 18 17.5
Gansu 43.9 35.6 15.5 29 22.7
Qinghai 5 1.7 1.7 17.8 17.7
Ningxia 53 49.9 50.7 22.7 18.5
Xinjiang 0.9 2.4 0.2 16.3 27.4
Source: World Bank 2000a.Bibliography
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